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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA M. WADE, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
RICHARD C. BURKE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Docket No. 890135 
Priority 14(b) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Based upon respondent Patricia M. Wade's dissatisfaction with 
the Statement of Issues presented in the Brief of Appellant, 
respondent Patricia M. Wade ("Ms. Wade") restates the issues in 
this case as follows: 
1. Does appellant Richard C. Burke ("Mr. Burke") have 
standing to raise the statute of limitations on behalf of his 
sister and co-defendant, Sandra L. Maxwell ("Ms. Maxwell"), who is 
not a party to this or any other appeal? 
2. Is this appeal moot based upon Ms. Maxwell's failure to 
appeal the Order and Judgment dated September 7, 1988, transferring 
title of one-half of the Pepperwood property to Ms. Wade? 
3. What statutes of limitations, if any, are applicable to 
the four separate counts in the Second Amended Complaint? 
4. Are the individual, separate causes of action in the 
Second Amended Complaint against Mr. Burke barred by any applicable 
statute of limitations? 
5. Are the causes of action in the Second Amended Complaint 
barred against Mr. Burke based upon the doctrines of collateral 
estoppel or res judicata? 
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATIONS ARE DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Anno. § 78-12-6 (1953), which is quoted on page 28-29, 
infra. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ms. Wade initiated this lawsuit against her ex-husband, Mr. 
Burke, his sister, Ms, Maxwell, and others, seeking one-half of a 
fifteen-acre parcel of property known as the Pepperwood property. 
In the event a portion of that property was awarded to Ms. Wade, 
she also sought to quiet title to that portion of the property 
awarded to her. Due to Ms. Maxwell's failure to comply with Court-
ordered discovery, the District Court entered an Order and Judgment 
dated September 7, 1988, sanctioning Ms. Maxwell for her failure 
to comply with discovery by transferring title to one-half of the 
Pepperwood property to Ms. Wade. Ms. Maxwell failed to appeal from 
the Order and Judgment. 
Later, after the scheduled trial date, the District Court 
entered a Summary Judgment against Mr. Burke, quieting title to the 
Pepperwood property awarded to Ms. Wade in her name. The District 
Court denied Mr. Burke's Motion for Summary Judgment, in which he 
asserted that the action against him was barred by the three-year 
statute of limitations, because it was moot and not well taken. 
2 
Mr. Burke appeals from the December 2, 1988, Order of the District 
Court. There are no other parties to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Divorce Proceeding Between Ms. Wade and Mr. Burke. 
On August 6, 1974, Ms. Wade filed a Complaint seeking a 
divorce from Mr. Burke. A trial in the divorce proceeding was 
held in October of 1980, but it was not until January 19, 1984, 
that a Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc was entered. On appeal, the 
2 Utah Supreme Court affirmed the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc. 
The Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc addressed five separate parcels 
of real property: (1) the Pepperwood property, which is the 
subject matter of this lawsuit;3 (2) the Dimple Dell property;4 
(3) the Murray property; (4) the Namba Way property; and (5) the 
Burke v. Burke, in the Third Judicial District Court, Civil 
No. D-15225. 
2 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986); this case is now 
before this Court on Mr. Burke's appeal from the District Court's 
refusal to allow additional offsets to judgments in Ms. Wade's 
favor for past-due child support totaling $18,426.91, Utah Court 
of Appeals Docket No. 890371-CA. Ms. Wade filed a Motion for 
Summary Disposition in this most recent appeal. 
3 
A map of the Pepperwood property is located at R. 382. 
4 . . . . . . . 
Wade v. Burke, in the Third Judicial District Court, Civil 
No. C87-2491 (this case currently is pending before Judge Brian). 
5 
Advance Business Equipment v. Wade, Utah Court of Appeals 
Docket No. 860070-CA (in an unpublished Memorandum Decision dated 
December 7, 1987, this Court affirmed the District Court's granting 
of Ms. Wade's Motion for Summary Judgment against Mr. Burke's alter 
ego, Advance Business Equipment); Mr. Burke filed another lawsuit 
on the Murray Property in his own name, which was dismissed with 
3 
Idaho property. 
Advance Business Equipment, Mr. Burke's alter ego, originally 
owned the Pepperwood property, and in 1976 transferred its interest 
in it to Mr. Burke's sister, Ms. Maxwell, who was a defendant in 
this action in the District Court. This transfer to Ms. Maxwell 
of $225,000.00 worth of property reputedly was in consideration for 
unpaid secretarial work. The Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc 
specifically found that the fifteen acres of unimproved Pepperwood 
property was not marital property and, therefore, took no action 
concerning it. This portion of the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc 
was based upon the testimony of Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell that Mr. 
Burke no longer had any interest in the Pepperwood property, having 
transferred it to his sister, Ms. Maxwell, prior to the trial in 
the divorce proceeding. The Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc, 
however, also contained a provision awarding one-half of any other 
property owned by Mr. Burke to Ms. Wade.7 
prejudice: Burke v. Wade, Civil No. C88-03813. 
See Intermountain Holding Co. v. Advance Business 
Equipment, Utah Court of Appeals Docket No. 870156-CA (this Court 
summarily affirmed the District Court's Order denying Advance 
Business Equipment's Motion to Set Aside). 
7 
Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc Paragraph 6, a copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit A in the Addendum. 
4 
B. Ms. Wade's Discovery of the Scheme. 
At approximately the time the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc 
was entered, Ms. Wade became concerned that other property subject 
to the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc, including the properties 
located on Namba Way in Murray, Utah, and at 2476 East Charles Road 
in the Dimple Dell Subdivision located in Sandy, Utah, also had 
been fraudulently conveyed to Ms. Maxwell. Consequently, Ms. Wade 
a . 
ordered title reports on both properties. The Preliminary Title 
• 9 
Report on the Dimple Dell property dated September 20, 1984, 
disclosed a Notice of Contract dated February 28, 1983, giving 
notice of a transfer by Mr. Burke's alter ego, Advance Business 
Equipment, to Mr. Burke's sister, Ms. Maxwell. 
At that time, it became apparent to Ms. Wade that Mr. Burke 
was involved in an effort to systematically defraud Ms. Wade of her 
interest in those properties, using a similar transfer to an 
identical person in an effort to thwart her ability to obtain title 
to those properties. Consequently, it did not become apparent 
Affidavit of Patricia M. Wade in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment Paragraph 3 ("Wade Affidavit") (R.167-
175) . 
o 
A copy of the September 20, 1984, Title Report on the 
Dimple Dell property as attached as Exhibit A to the Wade Affidavit 
(R. 170-74). 
Id. at Paragraph 5 (R. 168). 
Id. at Paragraph 6 (R. 168). 
5 
until September of 1984 that Mr. Burke had defrauded the Court in 
the Burke v. Burke divorce proceeding by similarly transferring the 
12 
Pepperwood property to his sister, Ms. Maxwell. When Mr. Burke's 
systematic fraud became apparent, Ms. Wade initiated this lawsuit 
13 in the District Court based upon this conclusion. 
C. The Initial Proceedings Before the District Court. 
On October 8, 1985, Ms. Wade initiated this action in the 
District Court against Mr. Burke, Ms. Maxwell, Advance Business 
Equipment and others alleging among other things that: (1) Mr. 
Burke and Ms. Maxwell committed fraud upon the District Court in 
the Burke v. Burke case and that their testimony in that matter 
was perjured; and (2) that Ms. Maxwell was holding the property in 
constructive trust for Mr. Burke, and Ms. Wade was entitled to one-
half of that interest under the terms of the Decree of Divorce Nunc 
Pro Tunc. Advance Business Equipment filed bankruptcy, and an 
Amended Complaint was filed eliminating Advance Business Equipment 
as a party. 
1 2
 Id. at Paragraph 7 (R. 168). 
13
 Id. at Paragraph 8 (R. 168-69). 
1 4
 R. 2-6. 
1 5
 R. 20-21. 
1 6
 R. 14-19. 
On May 18, 1987, Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell filed a Motion to 
17 • 
Dismiss and for Award of Attorneys1 Fees, together with a 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants Richard C. Burke [sic] and 
Sandra L. Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss and for Award of Attorneys' 
is Fees. In this motion, Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell sought to have 
the Amended Complaint dismissed based upon the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel. Ms. Wade filed Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss dated 
June 24, 1987. In their Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, for the first time, 
Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell alleged that the Amended Complaint failed 
to state fraud with particularity as required by U.R.C.P. 9(b). 
In an Order dated July 7, 1987,21the District Court denied in 
part and granted in part Mr. Burke's and Ms. Maxwell's Motion to 
Dismiss. The District Court found that the prior proceeding — 
Burke v. Burke — did not collaterally estop Ms. Wade from 
proceeding in this action, but that the Amended Complaint failed 
to state fraud with particularity as required by U.R.C.P. 9(b). 
1 7
 R. 43. 
18
 R. 44-60. 
19
 R. 85-91. 
2 0
 R. 99-102. 
2 1
 R. 104-05. 
The Court granted Ms. Wade ten days to file a Second Amended 
Complaint stating fraud with particularity, which Ms. Wade did in 
22 
a Second Amended Complaint dated July 10, 1987. In Count IV of 
the Second Amended Complaint, Ms. Wade also sought to have title 
to one-half of the Pepperwood property quieted in the event the 
23 
District Court awarded it to her. Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell filed 
an Answer dated August 31, 1987, but failed to assert as an 
25 
affirmative defense any statute of limitations defense. 
2 6 
In a Motion for Summary Judgment and in a Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
27 
Judgment both dated March 15, 1988, Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell 
attempted to assert a statute of limitations defense and, once 
again, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel as a 
basis for dismissal of the action against them. Ms. Wade filed the 
Affidavit of Patricia M. Wade in Opposition to Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment dated March 21, 1988, ° a Memorandum in 2 2
 R. 106-15. 
2 3
 R. 114. 
2 4
 R. 116-21. 
2 5
 R. 121. 
2 6
 R. 148-49. 
2 7
 R. 150-65. 
2 8
 R. 167-75. 
8 
Opposition to Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 
24, 1988,29and a Rule 56(f) Affidavit30in opposition to Mr. Burke's 
and Ms. Maxwell's Motion for Summary Judgment. In the Rule 56(f) 
Affidavit, Ms. Wade complained that considerable discovery was 
outstanding to which Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell had not yet 
responded, including three sets of interrogatories and three sets 
of requests for production of documents. Ms. Wade also protested 
that the depositions of both Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell were 
scheduled prior to the filing of the motion, but had not yet been 
taken. Ms. Wade contended that the outstanding discovery would 
have a bearing upon the material facts of the pending Motion for 
Summary Judgment. In an Order dated April 8, 1988, the District 
Court deferred the hearing on the Motion for a Summary Judgment of 
Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell until the completion of discovery and set 
the case down for a four-day trial scheduled to begin on June 27, 
1988. The trial date was later postponed until July 26, 1988. 
D
* Mr. Burke's and Ms. Maxwell's Failure to Comply with 
Discovery. 
On April 15, 1988, Ms. Wade filed a Motion to Compel against 
2 9
 R. 176-186. 
3 0
 R. 187-88. 
3 1
 See R. 143-44 & 146-47. 
3 2
 See R. 141-42. 
33
 R. 192-93. 
9 
Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell based upon their failure to comply with 
the discovery outstanding at the time they filed their Motion for 
Summary Judgment.34 An identical Motion to Compel was filed in a 
related case over the Dimple Dell property in the Third Judicial 
District Court entitled Patricia M. Wade v. Richard C. Burke, et 
al., Civil No. C87-2491, before the Honorable Pat B. Brian, which 
is still pending (the "Dimple Dell case"). The Dimple Dell case 
is based upon Mr. Burke's transfer of the Dimple Dell property to 
Ms. Maxwell after the trial but before the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc. The parties stipulated to be bound in the 
instant case by any order entered in the Dimple Dell case because 
35 
the Motions to Compel were virtually identical. 
As a result of the Motion to Compel filed in the Dimple Dell 
case, a three-and-one-half hour hearing was held before Judge Brian 
on May 18, 1988. The issues relating to the interrogatories were 
resolved at the hearing, but the documents responsive to the 
requests for production of documents remained outstanding. Judge 
Brian ordered Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell to produce all of the 
documents requested in Ms. Wade's requests for production of 
documents. Ms. Maxwell, however, only produced a limited number 
^* R. 223-83 
3 5
 R. 320. 
10 
of documents. 
As a result of her failure to comply with the outstanding 
discovery and Judge Brian's Order, about forty-five days before the 
trial was scheduled in this case, Ms. Wade filed a Motion for 
37 
Sanctions dated June 10, 1988. A hearing was held on Ms. Wade's 
38 
Motion for Sanctions on July 8, 1988. 
On July 14, 1988, the District Court entered an Order 
memorializing the July 8, 1988, hearing, which reads as follows: 
1. On or before July 13, 1988, at 5:00 p.m., 
defendant Richard C. Burke is ordered to produce all 
documents in his possession or readily available to him 
requested in Plaintiff's First Request for Production of 
Documents to Richard C. Burke dated October 13, 1987, and 
Plaintiff's Second Set of Requests for Production of 
Documents to Richard C. Burke dated March 8, 1988. 
2. Defendant Sandra L. Maxwell is ordered to 
produce all documents in her possession or readily 
available to her requested in Plaintiff's First Request 
for Production of Documents to Sandra L. Maxwell dated 
September 3, 1987, Plaintiff's Second Set of Requests for 
Production of Documents to Sandra L. Maxwell dated March 
3, 1988, and Plaintiffs Third Set of Requests for 
Production of Documents to Sandra Maxwell dated March 8, 
1988. 
3. On or before July 13, 1988, at 5:00 p.m., 
defendants Richard C. Burke and Sandra L. Maxwell shall 
file with the clerk's office affidavits, signed under 
oath, stating that they have individually and with the 
advice of counsel reviewed each of the preceding Requests 
R. 366-67. 
R. 319-22. 
R. 329-30. 
R. 336-38. 
36 
37 
38 
39 
11 
for Production of Documents and have fully complied by 
producing to plaintiff's counsel all documents responsive 
to these Requests for Production of Documents which are 
either in their possession or readily available to them. 
4. In the event that either defendant Richard C. 
Burke or Sandra L. Maxwell fail to comply with any 
provision of this Order, . . . after determining non-
compliance, the Court will strike that individual 
defendant's Answer and enter judgment according to the 
prayer in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. 
On July 13, 1988, Ms. Maxwell served upon Ms. Wade's counsel 
an Affidavit unequivocally stating that she had produced all 
documents in her possession or readily available to her to Ms. 
Wade's counsel. Mr. Burke, however, never filed or served the 
affidavit required by the District Court's Order dated July 14, 
1988.41 
E. Ms. Maxwell's Perjured Testimony Relating to Discovery. 
On July 13, 1988, after Ms. Maxwell served her Affidavit, 
Phillip E. Maxwell, her husband, testified under oath that Ms. 
Maxwell had committed perjury in several substantial aspects of 
this case and had not produced all of the documents in her 
possession. Mr. Maxwell's testimony demonstrated that Ms. Maxwell 
had in her possession documents which she had not produced to Ms. 
Ms. Maxwell's Affidavit was never filed with the Clerk's 
Office as required by the Order dated July 14, 1988, and does not 
appear as part of the record on appeal, but is attached as Exhibit 
B in the Addendum. 
Affidavit in Support of Motion to Reconsider (executed by 
Ms. Maxwell's counsel Randall Richards) dated August 24, 1988, at 
Paragraph 12 (R. 386-90) ("Richards Affidavit"). 
12 
Wade's counsel, contrary to the District Court's Order dated July 
14, 1988, and contrary to Ms. Maxwell's Affidavit dated July 13, 
1988.42 
Mr. Maxwell's deposition revealed that Ms. Maxwell blatantly 
committed perjury in her deposition on several key aspects of this 
case, just as she did before the District Court in the prior 
divorce proceeding. Ms. Maxwell testified that she owned the 
Pepperwood property which forms the subject matter of this lawsuit 
and had not transferred it to any other person. After having 
lunch with her attorney, however, her testimony changed, and she 
admitted that she transferred the Pepperwood property to a 
corporation known as Trendland, Inc. Ms. Maxwell also testified 
that she was not an officer or director in any other corporation, 
and that she did not own any stock in any corporation other than 
Advance Business Equipment. 
Ms. Maxwell failed to produce any of the documents relating 
to Trendland, Inc. During the pendency of this action, Ms. Maxwell 
** R. 523. 
43 
Sandra L. Maxwell Depo. Trans, at 57 (R. 524). 
44 . . 
A copy of page 61 of the Reporter's Transcript in "Patricia 
M. Wade v. Richard C. Burke, et al," Civil No. C87-2491, is 
attached as Exhibit A to the Memorandum in Support of Wade's Motion 
for Entry of Judgment pursuant to this Court's Order dated July 14, 
1988, ("Reporter's Trans.") (R. 353). 
4 5
 Id. at 22-23 (attached as Exhibit B) (R. 354). 
13 
transferred the Pepperwood property to Trendland, Inc., in which 
she claimed a 100% ownership position. Ms. Wade, however, obtained 
a copy of the Articles of Incorporation of Trendland, Inc., from 
46 
the Department of Business Regulation, Corporate Division. Ms. 
Maxwell's reluctance to produce even the Articles of Incorporation 
for Trendland, Inc., is understandable when that document is 
examined. In her deposition, she claimed that her brother, Mr. 
Burke, and his secretary were not involved in the formation or 
operation of the corporation. She insisted that they w€*re neither 
officers, directors nor incorporators.4 The Articles of 
Incorporation, however, demonstrate that this is perjured 
testimony. Mr. Burke, his secretary and his son were the original 
incorporators of Trendland, Inc., and Mr. Burke and his son remain 
as the only officers and two of the three directors of Trendland, 
48 . . . 
Inc. Contrary to her contention, Ms. Maxwell is not an original 
incorporator of this corporation and was not a director at the time 
she transferred the Pepperwood property to Trendland, Inc. 
A certified copy of the Articles of Incorporation of 
Trendland, Inc., is attached as Exhibit D to Wade's Motion for 
Entry of Judgment pursuant to this Court's Order dated July 13, 
1988 (R. 357-60). 
4 7
 Sandra L. Maxwell Depo. Trans, at 73 (R. 524). 
A certified copy of the Corporation Annual Report of 
Trendland, Inc., is attached as Exhibit E to Wade's Motion for 
Entry of Judgment pursuant to this Court's Order dated July 13, 
1988 (R. 316-62). 
14 
Further, despite her protestations that no stock has been 
issued for Trendland, Inc., and her earlier perjured testimony that 
she owned no interest in any other corporation besides Advance 
Business Equipment, Ms. Maxwell did not produce any of the 
corporate documents relating to Trendland, Inc., such as stock 
certificates, Articles of Incorporation, minutes of Board of 
Director's meetings, bank accounts, etc. She also did not produce 
a copy of the Warranty Deed transferring the Pepperwood property 
to her brother's corporation, Trendland, Inc., an extremely 
critical document in this case. 
Ms. Maxwell further perjured herself when she testified that 
she did not own any interest in any real property other than the 
Pepperwood property, the Dimple Dell property, the Namba Way 
A a 
property, and her home. Her husband, however, testified that in 
June of 1985, he and Ms. Maxwell purchased a parcel of real 
property located at 4318 South 4710 West, West Valley City, Utah.50 
Ms. Maxwell intentionally excluded disclosing the rental property 
she owned in West Valley City. The West Valley City property was 
germane to this action for two reasons: (1) it shows that Mr. and 
Mrs. Maxwell deduct their property taxes on their income tax 
returns; and (2) a loan application was filled out containing 
Reporter's Trans, at 60 (attached as Exhibit C) (R. 355). 
Phillip E. Maxwell Depo. Trans, at 14 (R. 523). 
15 
financial information when they purchased that property, a document 
Ms. Maxwell failed to produce. 
Ms. Maxwell went into an extended, perjured farce when she 
described the payment of $30,000.00 in property taxes on the 
Pepperwood property. She went through an elaborate story about how 
she saved $30,000.00 in cash around her house, how her husband had 
contributed most of those funds, and how she gave the $30,000.00 
in cash to her brother, Mr. Burke, in a conference room at St. 
Benedict's Hospital in Ogden, Utah, where she works. Mr. Burke 
supposedly drove from Ogden to Salt Lake City with the $30,000.00 
in cash and paid the real property taxes at the Salt Lake County 
Assessor's Office. Actually, these real property taxes have never 
been paid. Not surprisingly, Mr. and Mrs. Maxwell did not deduct 
a $30,000.00 payment of the Pepperwood property taxes on their 1986 
Utah State or Federal Income Tax Returns, although they did deduct 
property taxes paid on both their home and the West Valley City 
property. Ms. Maxwell explained the reason they did not take the 
$30,000.00 deduction on their income tax return as "I just didn't" ' 
and "I don't have the receipt."53 
Maxwell Depo. Trans, at 47-52 (R. 524). 
Id. at 95 (R. 524). 
Id. at 96 (R. 524). 
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Phillip E. Maxwell testified that he never contributed any 
funds to the payment of the property taxes for the Pepperwood 
property, never had any discussions relating to the Pepperwood 
property with his wife, although she described these in elaborate 
54 
detail, and never accumulated $30,000.00 around their house. Mr. 
Maxwell was not even aware of the existence of the Pepperwood 
55 
property until two days before his deposition. He concluded that 
all of Ms. Maxwell's testimony was inaccurate. Mr. Burke, Ms. 
Maxwell's brother, denies ever receiving the $3 0,000.00 in cash. 
Ms. Maxwell did not produce any of the documents relating to 
the West Valley City property. These documents, however, tend to 
prove that she has committed perjury in connection with the 
incredible lie about the $30,000.00 in cash she gave her brother 
to pay the Pepperwood real property taxes. She also did not 
produce the loan applications for the West Valley City property, 
despite Mr. Maxwell's testimony that they have a copy of it in 
57 
their possession. Mr. Maxwell also testified that they had a 
C Q 
$20,000.00 home equity line of credit on their home, although Ms. 
54 
Phillip E. Maxwell Depo. Trans, at 19-22 (R. 523). 
5 5
 Id. at 10-11 & 18 (R. 523). 
56 
Burke Depo. Trans, at 78-80. 
57 
Phillip E. Maxwell Depo. Trans, at 17 (R. 523). 
5 8
 Id. at 27 (R. 523). 
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Maxwell did not produce the loan applications for that loan. These 
loan applications would demonstrate that Ms. Maxwell individually 
did not have the financial wherewithal to generate $30,000.00 in 
cash to pay the property taxes on the Pepperwood property. 
Ms. Maxwell produced the front page only of her Federal Income 
Tax Returns for the years 1984 through 1987. She, however, did not 
produce a single State Income Tax Return. Also, despite the fact 
that Ms. Wade's counsel forwarded IRS Form 4506 to her attorney for 
execution, so that Ms. Wade could obtain full copies of her Federal 
income tax returns, she refused to execute that document or produce 
full copies of her tax returns. 
F. The Aborted Settlement of the Case. 
The trial in this case was scheduled to begin on July 24, 
1988, and continue for four days. After Mr. Maxwell's deposition, 
the parties entered into settlement negotiations, and Ms. Maxwell 
advised her attorney to accept Ms. Wade's offer. In July of 1988, 
orally and through their counsel, Ms. Wade and Ms. Maxwell reached 
a settlement of the case. Even Mr. Burke's attorney thought that 
the case had been settled. Based upon the agreement reached 
" Richards Affidavit Paragraph 3, 4 & 11 (R. 386-88). 
6 0
 Id. 
6 1
 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Reconsider (filed by Mr. 
Burke's counsel, John T. Caine) at Paragraph 10 (R. 391-95) ("Caine 
Affidavit"). 
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between Ms. Maxwell's counsel and Ms. Wade's counsel, the trial 
62 
date before the District Court was stricken. 
Mr. Burke's counsel advised him not to interfere in the 
settlement as its terms were appropriate.63 Mr. Burke, however, 
interfered with the negotiations and placed pressure upon his 
64 
sister, Ms. Maxwell, to not execute the settlement documents. Ms. 
Maxwell's counsel of record blamed Mr. Burke for interfering with 
the settlement process, causing Ms. Maxwell to not comply with 
discovery or consummate the settlement transaction. 
G. The Discovery Sanction Against Ms. Maxwell Transferring One-
Half of the Pepperwood Property to Ms. Wade. 
66 
On August 15, 1988, the District Court held a hearing on Ms. 
Wade's Motion for Entry of Judgment pursuant to this Court's Order 
67 
dated July 14, 1988. This hearing resulted in an Order and 
68 
Judgment dated September 7, 1988, imposing sanctions under 
U.R.C.P. 37 upon Ms. Maxwell for her failure to comply with 
discovery. The Order and Judgment struck Ms. Maxwell's Answer and 
6 2
 Caine Affidavit Paragraph 14 (R. 393). 
63
 Id. at Paragraph 13 (R. 393). 
Richards Affidavit at Paragraph 13 (R. 388). 
6 5
 Id. at Paragraph 21 (R. 389). 
6 6
 R. 341. 
6 7
 R. 342-63. 
68 
R. 399-401; attached as Exhibit C in the Addendum. 
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all affirmative defenses and entered judgment in accordance with 
69 
the prayer contained in the Second Amended Complaint. The Order 
and Judgment transferred one-half of the Pepperwood property to Ms. 
70 • . 
Wade and imposed attorneys' fees and costs in favor of Ms. Wade 
71 
and against Ms. Maxwell in the sum of $5,384.35. Ms. Wade then 
recorded the Order and Judgment, which transferred to Ms. Wade 
title to one-half of the Pepperwood property. 
On December 28, 1988, Ms. Maxwell filed a Motion for Relief 
from Judgment, together with a Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
72 
Relief from Judgment. In this motion, Ms. Maxwell sought to have 
the Court extend the time within which she could file a Notice of 
Appeal. The District Court denied this motion in an Order dated 
73 
February 17, 1989. In a compromise, Ms. Maxwell agreed not to 
appeal the District Court's Order dated February 17, 1989, denying 
her Motion for Relief from Judgment or any other Order entered by 
the District Court in this case. Consequently, Ms. Maxwell is not 
Order and Judgment dated September 7, 1988, at Paragraph 
3 (R. 400). The District Court's action is authorized by U.R.C.P. 
37(b)(2)(c). 
7 0
 Id. at Paragraph 4 (R. 400). 
7 1
 Id. at Paragraph 6 (R. 401). 
7 2
 R. 475-79. 
7 3
 R. 515. 
7 4
 Partial Satisfaction of Judgment dated March 27, 1989, at 
2 (appears in the record as the third from the last page in Volume 
II, although it is not numbered; it is attached as Exhibit D in the 
20 
a party to this appeal. 
H. The Motion for Summary Judgment Against Mr. Burke Quieting 
Title in Ms. Wade. 
On October 4, 1988, over two months after the scheduled trial 
75 
date, Mr. Burke refiled his Motion for Summary Judgment. On 
October 21, 1988, Ms. Wade filed Wade's Motion for Summary Judgment 
7 6 
Against Defendant Richard C. Burke, together with a Memorandum in 
Support of Wade's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant 
. 77 
Richard C. Burke. On November 3, 1988, Ms. Wade filed a 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Burke's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, suggesting among other things, that Mr. Burke's Motion 
78 
for Summary Judgment was moot. In an Order dated December 2, 
1988, the District Court granted Ms. Wade's Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Mr. Burke based upon Mr. Burke's claim that he had 
79 
no interest in the Pepperwood property. The District Court also 
denied Mr. Burke's Motion for Summary Judgment because Mr. Burke's Addendum). 
75 
Defendant Burke's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion 
in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Settlement dated 
October 4, 1988 (R. 410-14). 
7 6
 R. 432-34. 
7 7
 R. 428-31. 
7 8
 R. 443-49. 
79 
Answer paragraph 37 (R. 120); Burke Depo. Trans, at 69 (R 
431) . 
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counsel failed to reschedule Mr. Burke's Motion for Summary 
Judgment for hearing on a substantive basis prior to the scheduled 
trail date and prior to the entering of the Order and Judgment 
against Ms. Maxwell for sanctions. In this Order, the District 
Court found that Mr. Burkefs Motion for Summary Judgment was not 
well taken and was moot. 
This is Mr. Burke's appeal from the Order dated December 2, 
1988, denying his Motion for Summary Judgment. No other defendant 
in this action before the District Court, including Ms. Maxwell, 
is a party to this or any other appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Burke does not have standing to raise the statute of 
limitations defense on behalf of anyone other than himself. The 
holder of the title to the Pepperwood property, Ms. Maxwell, was 
unable to appeal the Order and Judgment dated September 7, 1988, 
and chose not to appeal the District Court's denial of her Motion 
for an Extension of Time. Mr. Burke has no standing to have the 
title to the Pepperwood property transferred back to Ms. Maxwell. 
The status of the title of the Pepperwood property is resolved, and 
Mr. Burke, who has no standing, cannot alter it. 
This, of course, makes Mr. Burke's appeal based upon the 
three-year statute of limitations moot. This Court could take no 
action that would affect the title to the Pepperwood property. 
Even if this Court reversed and directed the District Court to 
22 
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint against Mr. Burke with 
prejudice, this would not affect the title to the Pepperwood 
property. 
The first two counts in the Second Amended Complaint allege 
fraud upon the Court. This independent, equitable action is 
subject only to the doctrine of laches and is not subject to any 
statute of limitations. 
In any event, the three-year statute of limitations is not 
applicable to this case. Ms. Wade's Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Mr. Burke was based simply upon her prayer to quiet title 
to any interest in the Pepperwood property she obtained. She could 
have brought that action against Mr. Burke, who did not even appear 
as a titleholder of record of the Pepperwood property, at any time 
within seven years after he claimed any interest. Mr. Burke, 
however, adamantly asserts in both his pleadings, sworn testimony 
and arguments before the District Court that he has no interest in 
the Pepperwood property. The District Court, therefore, was 
correct in agreeing with Mr. Burke and quieting title in Ms. Wade's 
name. 
Further, Ms. Wade's Second Amended Complaint was not mono-
dimensional. It contained four separate counts, only two of which 
contained fraud allegations. The third count was based upon Ms. 
Wade's theory that Ms. Maxwell was holding the property in 
constructive trust for Mr. Burke. Under the terms of the Decree 
23 
of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc, Ms. Wade was entitled to one-half of that 
interest. If this count is subject to a statute of limitations, 
it would be subject to the four-year statute of limitations. 
Mr. Burke did not properly raise the statute of limitations 
as an affirmative defense in his Answer, which he acknowledges he 
was required to do. Even if he properly raised it, the Court 
correctly established the completion of discovery as a condition 
precedent to Mr. Burke's renewal of his Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Mr. Burke never complied with the discovery in this case 
and, therefore, never satisfied the condition precedent. 
Not only did he not comply with discovery, but he failed to 
schedule the motion for hearing before the District Court prior to 
the scheduled trial date. This trial date was cancelled due to an 
oral settlement reached between the parties, but Mr. Burke 
improperly interfered with that settlement negotiation and 
prevented his sister from executing the written settlement 
documents. The District Court was understandably irritated at Mr. 
Burke's interference in this process, which his own counsel 
documents, and for failing to renew his motion prior to the 
scheduled trial date. 
24 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MR. BURKE DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO ASSERT THE 
CLAIMS SET FORTH IN HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON BEHALF OF MS. MAXWELL. 
Mr. Burke testified in his deposition, pled in his Answer and 
argued to the District Court that he has no interest in the 
80 
Pepperwood property. For Mr. Burke to have standing, he must be 
able to show that he has some interest in the Pepperwood property. 
Without such an interest in the Pepperwood property, he cannot 
suffer a distinct injury giving him a stake in the outcome of the 
legal dispute: who is entitled to be the title owner of record of 
the Pepperwood property? Because Mr. Burke claimed to have no 
interest in the Pepperwood property, as he pled, stated and argued, 
he did not have standing to bring a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
81 
behalf of Ms. Maxwell. Mr. Burke did not have standing to bring 
his motion after the District Court already determined who owned 
the title to the Pepperwood property. Ms. Maxwell did not appeal 
the District Court's Order and Judgment dated September 7, 1988. 
Burke Depo. Trans, at 69 (R. 431); Answer at Paragraph 37 
(R. 120); Transcript of Motions for Summary Judgment at 19 (R. 
525) . 
81 
Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 
796, 799 (Utah 1986); Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Commission, 
624 P.2d 1138, 1145 (Utah 1981); Blodaett v. Zions First National 
Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 904-05 (Utah App. 1988); see York v. 
Unqualified Washington County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679, 680 
(Utah 1986). 
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Mr. Burke cannot raise any issues relating to its entry on her 
behalf. 
POINT II 
MR. BURKE'S APPEAL IN THIS CASE IS MOOT BECAUSE 
HE CLAIMS NO INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY, AND THE 
RECORD OWNER HAS NOT APPEALED THE DECISION 
ADVERSE TO HER TRANSFERRING TITLE TO ONE-HALF 
OF THE PROPERTY TO MS. WADE. 
Mr. Burke does not claim any interest in the Pepperwood 
property, although he continues to pursue this appeal. Therefore, 
it is of no consequence whether any action against Mr. Burke in 
this case is barred by the statute of limitations or on any other 
basis. His sister, Ms. Maxwell, did not appeal the Court's Order 
and Judgment which transferred to Ms. Wade one-half of the 
82 
Pepperwood property. Consequently, the only party who claims any 
interest in the Pepperwood property in this case, Ms. Maxwell, is 
content to abide by the Court's Order and Judgment. On the other 
hand, Mr. Burke — who claims no interest in the Pepperwood 
property — attempts to pursue this appeal. 
To make a ruling, this Court must have some justiciable issue 
before it. To do otherwise would violate the strong judicial 
ft 0 
Mr. Burke mistakenly asserts that the Order and Judgment 
dated September 7, 1988, was entered against Ms. Maxwell pursuant 
to U.R.C.P. 56 as a summary judgment. Brief of Appellant at 13 & 
21. Actually, the District Court sanctioned Ms. Maxwell for filing 
to comply with Court-ordered discovery pursuant to U.R.C.P. 
37(b)(2)(B)&(C). 
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policy against rendering advisory opinions. In determining 
whether this case is moot on appeal, this Court must determine 
whether any action it takes will have any effect on the parties, 
84. 
including Ms. Wade and Ms. Maxwell. Any action this Court takes 
in either affirming or reversing this case based upon Mr. Burke's 
appeal would have no effect upon the Order and Judgment against Ms. 
Maxwell. Without disturbing the Order and Judgment against Ms. 
Maxwell, who is not a party to this appeal, any direction of this 
Court based upon Mr. Burke's appeal could not disturb the title to 
the property: one-half of which is now vested in Ms. Maxwell's 
name and one-half of which is now vested in Ms. Wade's name. 
There are only two things in Mr. Burke's favor this Court can 
do: (1) vacate the December 2, 1988, Order and remand for further 
proceedings; or (2) reverse with a direction to the District Court 
to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint as it relates to Mr. Burke 
with prejudice. If this Court follows the first option, the 
District Court can and probably will strike Mr. Burke's Answer and 
all affirmative defenses for failing to file his Affidavit required 
by the District Court's Order dated July 14, 1988, and for failing 
E.g., Merhish v. H.A. Folsom & Associates. 646 P.2d 731, 
732 (Utah 1982). 
84 
E.g., Arizona State Board of Directors for Junior Colleges 
v. Phoenix Union High School District, 102 Ariz. 69, 424 P.2d 819, 
823 (1967); Vinson v. Marton & Associates, 159 Ariz. 1, 764 P.2d 
736, 739 (Ariz. App. 1988). 
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to comply with discovery. 
If this Court chooses the second option, due to Ms. Maxwell's 
failure to appeal the District Court's adverse Order and Judgment 
against her, which transferred seven-and-one-half acres of the 
Pepperwood Property to Ms. Wade, any direction this Court gave to 
the District Court could not disturb the underlying rulings against 
the defendants other than Mr. Burke. Mr. Burke can only request 
that Ms. Wade's Second Amended Complaint be dismissed with 
prejudice against him: he is not in a position to assert that the 
Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed against any other 
defendant, such as Ms. Maxwell, the titleholder of record of one-
85 
half of the Pepperwood property. Because granting Mr. Burke's 
appeal and vacating or reversing the District Court's Order dated 
December 2, 1988, would have no effect on the title to the 
Pepperwood property, Mr. Burke's appeal is moot. 
Because the District Court struck Ms. Maxwell's Answer and 
entered judgment against her in accordance with the prayer in the 
Second Amended Complaint, this Court should accept eis true the 
allegations against Ms. Maxwell contained in the Second Amended 
Complaint. 
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POINT III 
AGAINST MR. BURKE, THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS IN THIS CASE IS THE SEVEN-YEAR 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOUND IN UTAH CODE ANNO. 
§ 78-12-6 (1953). 
There are four causes of action in the Second Amended 
Complaint. After title to one-half of the Pepperwood property was 
transferred to Ms. Wade in the Order and Judgment dated September 
7, 1988, Mr. Burke's position in this case was the same as that of 
any other defendant who did or may claim an interest in the real 
property. After the transfer of one-half of the property to Ms. 
Wade, the only issue remaining against Mr. Burke was whether he had 
any interest in Ms. Wade's half of the Pepperwood property. The 
first three causes of action against Mr. Burke became moot, and 
only the fourth cause of action to quiet the title to the property 
remained viable. Consequently, the correct statute of limitations 
is contained in Utah Code Anno. § 78-12-6 (1953), entitled "Actions 
or defenses founded upon title to real property," which reads as 
follows: 
No cause of action, or defense or counterclaim 
to an action, founded upon the title to real 
property or to rents or profits out of the 
same, shall be effectual, unless it appears 
that the person prosecuting the action, or 
interposing the defense or counterclaim, or 
under whose title the action is prosecuted or 
defense or counterclaim is made, or the 
ancestor, predecessor or grantor of such person 
was seized or possessed of the property in 
question within seven years before the 
committing of the act in respect to which such 
action is prosecuted or defense or counterclaim 
made. 
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In her Motion for Summary Judgment, all Ms. Wade requested the 
District Court to do was quiet title to the property against Mr. 
Burke. Because Mr. Burke claimed no interest in the seven-and-one-
half acres now in Ms. Wade's name, the District Court granted Ms. 
Wadefs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
POINT IV 
AN INDEPENDENT ACTION SEEKING EQUITABLE RELIEF 
IS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: 
IT IS ONLY SUBJECT TO THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES. 
There is no applicable statute of limitations to a cause of 
action alleging fraud upon the District Court. The doctrine of 
laches and other equitable principals determines the time within 
86 
which the action must be commenced. 
Ms. Wade pursued this matter by independent action as 
authorized by U.R.C.P. 60(b) in order to bring all necessary 
parties before the Court, including the titleholder of record, Ms. 
87 
Maxwell. Ms. Wade did not have a fair opportunity to litigate 
E.g.
 r St. Pierre v. Edmonds. 645 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah 
1982) (a copy of this case is attached as Exhibit D in the 
Addendum); Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 612 P.2d 1175, 1181 
(1980) . 
87 
There is a distinction between bringing a motion under 
U.R.C.P. 60(b) (3) and bringing an independent action under U.R.C.P. 
60(b) . The motion in the original case is subject to a three-month 
limitation after the order or judgment is entered. The independent 
action, however, is not subject to any such three-month limitation 
and is only subject to the doctrine of laches. Averbach v. Rival 
Manufacturing Co. , 809 F.2d 1016 (3d Cir. 1987) > cert, denied, 484 
U.S. (1988) (a copy of this case, which contains an excellent 
historical discussion of independent actions attacking judgments, 
is attached as Exhibit E in the Addendum); Bulloch v. United 
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the issues relating to the Pepperwood property in the Burke v. 
Burke divorce proceeding. Ms. Maxwell was not a party to that 
proceeding and was beyond the power of the Court. Fraud upon the 
Court is not subject to a statute of limitations, even the three-
year statute of limitations; a fraud committed upon a Court is 
subject only to the defense of laches. 
In any event, the District Court has retained jurisdiction 
over any property division in the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc, 
88 
including the Pepperwood property. 
POINT V 
IN ANY EVENT, THE THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE 
BECAUSE, IN ADDITION TO FRAUD, MS. WADE WAS 
SUING MR. BURKE BASED UPON THE PROVISION OF THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE NUNC PRO TUNC AWARDING HER 
ONE-HALF OF ANY OTHER PROPERTY MR. BURKE OWNED. 
The Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc awarded Ms. Wade one-half 
of any other property Mr. Burke owned. This provision was set 
forth in paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc, the 
same paragraph which divided other real property the parties owned 
into equal parts. A separate cause of action in Count III of the 
States, 721 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1983), reh'g granted, 763 F.2d 1115 
(10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 1086 (1986) (in an 
independent action seeking to overturn a judgment entered twenty-
five years earlier, only the doctrine of laches applies); West 
Virginia Oil & Gas Co. v. George E. Breece Lumber Co. , 213 F.2d 702 
(5th Cir. 1954); St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d at 618; 7 Moore's 
Federal Practice Paragraph 60.37[2] at 60-387 to 60-388. 
8 8
 E^g., Bovce v. Bovce. 609 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 1980). 
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Second Amended Complaint utilized this provision as a basis for 
recovery. Ms. Wade's theory was that Ms. Maxwell was holding the 
Pepperwood property in constructive trust for Mr. Burke. This 
theory, however, was never fully developed because of Ms. Maxwell's 
failure to comply with the District Court's discovery orders. The 
statute of limitations on this cause of action is a four-year 
89 
statute of limitations, which would not start to run, if ever, 
until the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc was entered. This 
lawsuit was initiated well within four years from the date of entry 
of the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc, granting Ms. Wade one-half 
of any other property Mr. Burke owned. 
POINT VI 
EVEN IF THE THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
WERE APPLICABLE, THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING 
WAS CORRECT BASED UPON THE FAILURE OF DISCOVERY 
AND THE FAILURE TO AFFIRMATIVELY PLEAD THE 
STATUTE AS A DEFENSE IN THE ANSWER. 
The Answer dated August 31, 1987, fails to raise the three-
90 
year statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. As Mr. 
Burke correctly points out, it is necessary to raise a statute of 
91 
limitations as an affirmative defense, which was not done in this 
oy
 Utah Code Anno. § 78-12-25 (1953, as amended). 
9 0
 R. 121; contrary to the assertion in the Brief of Appellant 
at 15, a statute of limitations is not jurisdictional. American 
Coal Co., v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984) (cited in the Brief 
of Appellant at 15). 
9 1
 Brief of Appellant at 15; U.R.C.P. 8(c) & 9(h). 
32 
case. U.R.C.P. 8(c) requires the statute of limitations defense 
to be plead affirmatively, and U.R.C.P, 9(h) states in part that 
"it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is barred by 
the provisions of the statute [of limitations] relied on, referring 
to or describing such statute specifically and definitely by 
section number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise 
identify the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify 
it. . . ." Consequently, without raising the issue and 
specifically identifying the statute he is relying upon as an 
affirmative defense in his Answer, Mr. Burke has no basis to assert 
it on appeal. 
Even if the statute were properly pled, the failure of 
discovery in this case prevented Mr. Burke from raising it. When 
Mr. Burke first filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on March 2, 
1988, large amounts of discovery were outstanding, including three 
sets of interrogatories and three requests for production of 
documents. Prior to the filing of Mr. Burke's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on March 2, 1989, the depositions of both Mr. Burke and 
Ms. Maxwell had been scheduled. In an Order dated April 8, 1988, 
the District Court allowed Ms. Wade additional time to conduct 
The Brief of Appellant, however, incorrectly notes that the 
statute of limitations was pled as an affirmative defense. Id. at 
15-16; contra R. 121. 
9 3
 R. 192-93. 
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discovery. Ms. Maxwell and Mr. Burke, however, never complied with 
this discovery, which was a condition precedent to any hearing on 
the statute of limitations defense. Mr. Burke failed to file the 
Affidavit required by the Court's Order dated July 14, 1988, in 
which he was to declare that he had fully complied with the 
discovery in this case. Consequently, Mr. Burke did not satisfy 
the condition precedent the District Court properly established 
before the statute of limitations defense could be presented and, 
therefore, is precluded from raising the statute of limitations 
defense now. 
Further, the trial in this case was scheduled for a four-day 
period beginning on July 26, 1988. Ms. Maxwell noticed up her 
Motion for Summary Judgment for hearing on July 15, 1989, eleven 
. 94 9l 
days prior to trial. It was stricken based upon the settlement. 
Mr. Burke, however, never renewed his Motion for Summary Judgment 
prior to the trial date, which was cancelled due to the settlement 
of the case. Mr. Burke improperly interfered with the execution 
of the settlement documents. His interference required the parties 
to continue with the case. Consequently, because Mr. Burke never 
scheduled the statute of limitations motion prior to the scheduled 
trial date, never raised it in his Answer, and never complied with 
R. 339. 
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the discovery which was a condition precedent to presenting the 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the statute of limitations, the 
District Court correctly denied Mr. Burkefs Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
POINT VII 
THE THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WOULD 
NOT BAR MS. WADE FROM PROCEEDING WITH THIS 
ACTION TO CONCLUSION. 
The final act constituting the fraud Ms. Wade claimed Mr. 
Burke and Ms. Maxwell perpetrated upon the District Court and upon 
her occurred upon the filing and execution of the Decree of Divorce 
Nunc Pro Tunc, which did not occur until September 19, 1984. This 
formed the basis for the first two counts of the Second Amended 
Complaint. Until that final act was committed, Ms. Wade had no 
basis upon which to file a lawsuit alleging fraud upon the Court. 
Further, Ms. Wade could not raise this issue by way of motion. 
The District Court ruled that the Pepperwood property was not 
marital property and specifically took no action on it. This 
ruling apparently was based upon the transfer of the Pepperwood 
property to Ms. Maxwell prior to trial. Ms. Maxwell was not a 
party to the Burke v. Burke divorce proceeding and, therefore, not 
subject to the Court's rulings in that case. The initiation of a 
new action, adding all interested and necessary parties, was more 
viable than any other alternative. 
35 
The fraud committed by Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell upon Ms. Wade 
did not occur until September 19, 1984, when the Decree of Divorce 
Nunc Pro Tunc was entered in the divorce proceeding between Ms. 
Wade and Mr. Burke. The Utah Supreme Court in Boyce v. Boyce, 609 
P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 1980), stated: 
A liberal standard for application of Rule 60(b) in 
divorce cases is justified by the doctrine of the 
continuing jurisdiction that a divorce court has over its 
decrees. Clearly, a court should modify a prior decree 
when the interests of equity and fair dealing with the 
court and the opposing party so require. Although the 
trial court displayed great patience in dealing with this 
case, we cannot avoid the conclusion, on the basis of the 
contentions before this Court, that an injustice may have 
been perpetrated by defendant's actions. Accordingly, 
we are compelled to the conclusion that the trial judge 
abused his discretion in not allowing plaintiff a hearing 
under Rule 60(b). 
The four-year delay between the trial in October of 1980 and 
the execution of the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc dated 
September 19, 1984, by the District Court was due to Mr. Burke's 
counsel's failure to draft and submit the decree to the Court for 
execution. Certainly, Ms. Wade cannot be held accountable for Mr. 
96 
Burke's inadvertence. Otherwise, Mr. Burke could avoid any attack 
upon the fraud he committed in the District Court trial simply by 
holding on to the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc for a sufficient 
period of time for the three-year statute of limitations to expire, 
which he did. 
Ms. Wade's counsel of record died in the interim. 
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POINT VIII 
THE DOCTRINES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES 
JUDICATA ARE INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
Counts III and IV of the Second Amended Complaint raised new 
issues never previously litigated. Count III alleged that Ms. 
Maxwell was holding property in constructive trust for Mr. Burke. 
It alleged that Ms. Wade was entitled to one-half of the property 
Ms. Maxwell was holding for Mr. Burke based, upon the Decree of 
Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc. Count IV was a quiet-title action. Those 
issues were never raised nor litigated in the Burke v. Burke 
proceeding. Unless raised and resolved, the doctrines of 
collateral estoppel and res judicata are inapplicable. 
The Pepperwood property was addressed in a cursory fashion in 
the Burke v. Burke proceeding. Ms. Maxwell, however, was not a 
party to that proceeding. Consequently, there was no issue in the 
Burke v. Burke proceeding as to whether Ms. Maxwell fraudulently 
obtained title to the Pepperwood property. The District Court 
simply was unable to resolve issues about third parties not joined 
in the Burke v. Burke divorce proceeding. 
Finally, the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata 
do not arise in situations where a party is claiming in an 
independent action that fraud has been committed upon the Court. 
Ms. Wade has a right to maintain an independent cause of action on 
that theory. Count I of the Second Amended Complaint is based upon 
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U.R.C.P. 60(b) and essentially alleges that Mr. Burke and Ms. 
Maxwell perjured themselves relating to the transaction between 
them transferring the title of the property from Advance Business 
Equipment to Ms. Maxwell. U.R.C.P. 60(b) states in part: "This 
rule does not limit the power of the court to entertain an 
independent action tc relieve a party from a judgment, order or 
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. 
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action." 
Ms. Wade chose to pursue this matter, as the rule allows, by 
an independent action. This is not a collateral attack; it is a 
direct attack upon the judgment based upon allegations that the 
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judgment was procured through the use of fraud. The Utah Supreme 
Court in St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982), expressly 
recognized as proper an independent action based upon fraud as a 
proper means of attacking a previously entered Decree of Divorce. 
To suggest that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes an 
independent action for fraud under U.R.C.P. 60(b) would be 
tantamount to writing the clause preserving independent actions out 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the doctrines 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel are not applicable in this 
case. 
y /
 Bowen v. Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602, 604 (1952); 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 70 (1980). 
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POINT IX 
MR. BURKE CANNOT INTRODUCE NEW EVIDENCE INTO 
THIS CASE ON APPEAL. 
The Brief of Appellant quotes extensively from what appears 
to be a trial transcript of the Burke v. Burke divorce 
proceeding. This quote is not part of the record on appeal. 
This trial transcript was never introduced into the evidence before 
the District Court in this case. Mr. Burke's attempt to introduce 
it as evidence at this late date is inappropriate. As Mr. Burke 
well knows, the preparation and introduction of that trial 
transcript during the course of the proceedings was necessary to 
introduce it into evidence. Mr. Burke never made any attempt to 
do so, and the trial transcript in the Burke v. Burke proceeding 
does not appear in the record on appeal in this case. 
Consequently, this Court should not consider it in ruling upon this 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell failed to comply with Court-ordered 
discovery, despite repeated opportunities to do so. This resulted 
in a sanction against Ms. Maxwell, striking her answer and all 
affirmative defenses, entering judgment against her in accordance 
with the prayer of the Second Amended Complaint, and imposing 
Brief of Appellant at 4-10. 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986). 
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attorneys1 fees and costs upon her. She did not appeal from that 
sanction. Mr. Burke, however, who has no standing to raise any 
issue on behalf of his co-defendant, Ms. Maxwell, continues to 
pursue this appeal. Because this Court could take no action that 
would affect the title to the Pepperwood property as a result of 
Mr. Burke's appeal, his appeal is moot. 
Counts I and II of the Second Amended Complaint are an 
independent action pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60(b). This independent, 
equitable action is subject only to the doctrine of laches. Even 
if subject to the three-year statute of limitations, the statute 
of limitations could not begin to run until the Decree of Divorce 
Nunc Pro Tunc was entered in 1974. Under any scenario, therefore, 
the action was commenced in a timely manner. These counts are a 
direct attack against the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc, not a 
collateral one. 
Count III of the Second Amended Complaint, however, was not 
an attack upon the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc. It was based 
upon a provision of the Decree awarding one-half of any other 
property Mr. Burke owned. The theory of recovery was that Ms. 
Maxwell held the Pepperwood property in constructive trust for Mr. 
Burke, and Ms. Wade was entitled to one-half of the property so 
held. This cause of action, therefore, was subject to at least a 
four-year statute of limitations. This count was not raised in any 
prior proceedings and, therefore, could not be subject to the 
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doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. 
Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint, which sought to 
quiet title against Mr. Burke, was the only remaining cause of 
action against Mr. Burke after Ms. Maxwell was sanctioned because 
the first three counts became moot. If this count is subject to 
a statute of limitations, it is subject to a seven-year statute of 
limitations, which did not begin to run until Ms. Wade obtained 
title to one-half of the Pepperwood property. Likewise, this count 
was not raised in any prior proceeding. Consequently, it is not 
subject to the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. 
All of the District Court's rulings in this case are proper 
and based upon undisputed facts. This Court, therefore, should 
affirm the District Court's Order dated December 2, 1988, and 
should award Ms. Wade her costs on this appeal. 
Dated: July 3, 1989. 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
*5ark*sA</ Lapgen 
Attorney^for Respondent 
Patricia M. Wade 
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ADDENDUM 
j«.;hn T. Caino of 
KICHAKDS, CAINE f. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Defendant 
256*i Washington Boulevard 
Oqtl«n, Utah 34 4 01 
Telephone: 39 3-5 367 
IN TH1-: DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
:
:ATKiC TA ?•',. BUfcKK, : 
DECREE OF DIVGKCE 
Plaintiff, : NUNC PRO TUNC 
v n. 
RICHARD C. BURKE, 
Defendant. 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
the 24th day of October, I960, before the Honorable .Ernest R. 
Baldwin, judge of the above entitled court, sitting without a 
jury, and plaintiff being personally present and represented by 
counsel, Gerald Gundry, and defendant being personally present 
and represented by counsel, John T. Caine, and testimony having 
been taken over a period of two days, and the court also 
requesting the filing of written memorandum, and after reviewing 
all of the evidence and the memorandums of the parties, and the 
court being fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore 
signed and entered herein its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, NOW, THEREFORE, 
ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
Civil No. D-15225 
lutL 'id \7^ 
r v / 
EXHIBIT A 
*^ 3 
1. That the parties were previously divorced by this eourt. 
on September 16, 1977, and the court;, therefore, for the purpose 
OL: this hearing, was to dispose of the marital property. 
2. That the plaintiff shall be awarded the custody or the 
parties' two minor children, subject; to reasonable visitation in 
the defendant. 
3. That judgment shall be entered against the defendant for 
So,900 for child supper* arrearage :;o dateo/. £?<^Vo L^e^j L *? <* O 
4. That the plaintiff shall not be awarded any alimony now 
or in the future. 
5. That plaintiff shall be awarded the home at 4590 South 
785 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. The defendant shall be awarded 
the adjoining acreage to the home. That each party shall assume 
and discharge any debt against the property and hold the other 
harmless therefrom. 
60 That the building lot in Dimple Del Subdivision #2 and j 
the cabin site in Island Park, Idaho", ^ haxl be awarded equally rto I 
the parties. &-*£- &JZ&^^sf>^^^ ^ ^ c ^ 
7. That the 15 acres of unimproved property knowrC^s Pepper j ^ j 
Wood is not marital property, and, therefore, no action shall be 
taken by the court concerning its disposition. 
8. That the plaintiff shall be awarded all of the 
furniture, fixtures and wares located in her possession with the 
exception of the following items currently in her possession, 
which shall be awarded to the defendant: the Navaho Indian rug, 
the Remington prints, a set of silver prints, a painting of a sea 
scape, a plaintiff of an Indian, a book of the Old West, all of 
which shall be awarded to the defendant. In addition, defendant 
shall be awarded his grandmother • «; orass bell, an Indian 
ceremonial rug, one of the three other Indian rugs, three pen 
sketches, three Hafen family history hooks and one-half oi all of 
the photographs. 
9. That defendant shall be awarded all of Ins interest in 
the company known as Advanced Business Equipment. 
10. That each party shall asruur*? ami discharge their own 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action and hold the 
other harmless therefrom. S^/^^^ • * # • 
DATED this _ 2 L day ofKcgus-r. 1984. ~ / f / ^ V ^ / v V ^ O^^O^c^.^ 
/yZO. , A THE COURT: 
fEST F. BALDWIN X^JR. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
S O 
Z i D r 
5 z S 
d O 
3 *I I ; a 
J 5 g S 
till 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS, #4503 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorney for Defendant Maxwell 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 399-4191 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA M. WADE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD C. BURKE, SANDRA 
L. MAXWELL, et al., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SANDRA L. MAXWELL 
Judge: Homer F. Wilkinson 
Civil No. C85-6773 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
SANDRA L. MAXWELL, being first duly sworn upon her oath, depose 
and states: 
1. I am one of the defendants in the above entitled action. 
2. That I have produced all of the documents that have been 
requested that I have access to. 
DATED this IQI day of July, 1988. 
SANDRA L. MAXWELL, Defendant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a Notary Public, this /J 
day of July, 1988. 
My Commissio 
Residing At: Ogden, Utah 
ussxon Expi 
//t/fo res: 
EXHIBIT B 
SeU Lake Couniy^ 
SEP If V&B 
MARK A. LARSEN 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main St., Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA M. WADE, 
Plaintiff, 
v . 
RICHARD C. BURKE, e t a l . , 
Defendants . 
<£ /t3£<? £L 
/€-/?-#& &:Q6 A-W 
ORDER and JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C85-6773 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
On August 15, 1988, at 8:30 a.m., Plaintiff's Motion for 
Entering Judgment Pursuant to this Court's Order Dated July 
14, 1988, came on for a special hearing before the above-
captioned Court, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding. 
Mark A. Larsen appeared and represented plaintiff Patricia M. 
Wade. After receiving proper notice, defendant Sandra L. 
Maxwell failed to appear personally or through her counsel of 
record, but John S. Adams appeared and entered his appearance 
on her behalf. The Court waited for twenty minutes until 
8:50 a.m. for Ms. Maxwell or her counsel of record, Randall 
Richards, to arrive, all to no avail. After entertaining the 
oral argument of counsel, reviewing the file, reviewing the 
Memorandum in Support Wade's Motion for Entry of Judgment 
Pursuant to this Court's Order Dated July 14, 1988, the 
EXHIBIT C 
deposition transcripts of Richard C. Burke, Sandra L. Maxwell 
and Phillip E. Maxwell, and all other documents contained in 
the file, and the Court being fully advised, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. Based upon the stipulation of counsel, Ms. Wade's 
oral motion to short the time to respond to Ms. Wade's Motion 
for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to This Court's Order Dated 
July 14, 1988, is granted, and the Court finds that notice to 
Ms* Maxwell of this Motion was proper. 
2. Plaintiff Patricia M. Wade's Motion for Entry of 
Judgment Pursuant to this Court's Order Dated July 14, 1988, 
is granted. 
3. Ms. Maxwell's Answer and all affirmative defenses 
contained in it are stricken, and judgment is entered against 
Ms. Maxwell in part in accordance with the prayer contained 
in Ms. Wade's Second Amended Complaint. 
4. Ms. Wade is awarded all right, title and interest 
of defendant Sandra L. Maxwell ("Ms. Maxwell") held in the 
property forming the subject-matter of this lawsuit, located 
in Salt Lake County, Utah, and more particularly described as 
follows ("the Property"): 
Commencing 80 rods West and 16 rods South, and 3 0 
rods West from the Northeast corner of section 22, 
township 3 South, range 1 east, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian and running thence South 660 feet; thence 
West 30 rods; thence North 660 feet; thence East 3 0 
rods to the point of beginning. 
5. The transfer of title to the Property described in 
2 
the preceding paragraph from Sandra L. Maxwell to Patricia M. 
Wade is retroactive to November 7, 1985, at 4:13 p.m. , the 
date and time of the recording of the Lis Pendens in the 
above-captioned case with the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
Office as Entry No. 4161446 in Book 5707 at Page 2116, and 
all parties claiming any interest in the Property described 
in the preceding paragraph as a result of a transfer after 
November 7, 1985, at 4:13 p.m., are divested of any all such 
interest in the Property, title to which is quieted in the 
name of plaintiff Patricia M. Wade. 
6. A judgment is entered in favor of Ms. Wade and 
against Ms. Maxwell in the sum of $5,384.35, which represents 
reasonable attorneys' fees in the sum of $2,153.25 and costs 
in the sum of $3,231.10, all of which were incurred in order 
to prove that Ms. Maxwell committed perjury in the testimony 
given in her deposition. 
7. This Order is not intended to and does not affect 
the rights, title and interest of the remaining defendants in 
the Property.
 0 
Dated: August _^ , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
-• /\^~- Y '/* 
Jfomer F. Wilkinson 
^JiT"" D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
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ST. PIERRE i 
Cite as, Utah, 
to redeem the property, which she did, the 
second attorney did not effect a redemption 
and the redemption period expired. The 
client's action against this second attorney 
was settled for $4,000 during the trial, and 
is not before us on appeal. 
On this appeal from the granting of sum-
mary judgment to the first attorney, the 
client contends that the record disclosed a 
genuine issue of fact, specifically, whether 
the defendant exercised "due care in per-
forming the duties reasonably to be expect-
ed of an attorney under the circumstances." 
[1] An attorney is required to possess 
the legal knowledge and skills common to 
members of his profession, Young v. Brid-
well, 20 Utah 2d 332, 338, 437 P.2d 686, 690 
(1968), and to represent his client's interests 
with competence and diligence. Dunn v. 
McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 
Utah, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (1978). 
[2,3] Ordinarily, whether a defendant 
has breached the required standard of care 
is a question of fact for the jury. FMA 
Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance Co., 
Utah, 594 P.2d 1332 (1979); Jensen v. Do-
len, 12 Utah 2d 404, 367 P.2d 191 (1962). 
Consequently, a motion for summary judg-
ment should be denied where the evidence 
presents a genuine issue of material fact 
which, if resolved in favor of the nonmov-
ing party, would entitle him to judgment as 
a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Rus-
sell v. Park City Utah Corp., 29 Utah 2d 
184, 506 P.2d 1274 (1973); University Club 
v. Invesco Holding Corp., 29 Utah 2d 1,504 
P.2d 29 (1972).1 A genuine issue of fact 
exists where, on the basis of the facts in the 
record, reasonable minds could differ on 
whether defendant's conduct measures up 
to the required standard. Singleton v. Al-
exander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 
(1967); FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby 
Insurance Co., supra. 
1. In contrast, a motion for summary judgment 
may be granted where the pleadings, deposi-
tions, affidavits, admissions, and answers to 
interrogatories, viewed in the light most favor-
able to the nonmoving party, show that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and that 
w. EDMONDS Utah 615 
645P.2d615 
[4] After reviewing the record in this 
case, we conclude that reasonable minds 
could differ on the question of whether the 
attorney's actions in this matter measured 
up to the standard of care required of attor-
neys in their professional duties. We there-
fore reverse the summary judgment and 
remand the case for trial on that issue. 
Costs to appellant. 
HALL, C. J., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
Sandra ST. PIERRE, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Stanley W. EDMONDS, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 17075. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 19, 1982. 
Ex-wife brought action alleging that 
ex-husband used harassment, threats of 
bodily harm and physical abuse and intimi-
dation to force her to sign documents which 
resulted in substantially reducing her share 
in property settlement in divorce action and 
in preventing her from contesting allega-
tions in divorce complaint and sought dam-
ages or, alternatively, imposition of con-
structive trust. The Fifth District Court, 
Washington County, J. Harlan Burns, J., 
dismissed amended complaint, and ex-wife 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., 
held that complaint did state claim upon 
which relief could be granted. 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Bihlmaier 
v. Carson, Utah, 603 P.2d 790 (1979); Living-
ston Industries, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust 
Co., Utah. 565 P.2d 1117 (1977). 
EXHIBIT D 
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Affirmed in part and reversed and re-
manded in part. 
1. Divorce e=>254(2) 
Although court has continuing jurisdic-
tion over its decree in divorce proceeding 
for alimony, support, and division of proper-
ty, motion to modify decree must be made 
in original action and allege changed cir-
cumstances sufficient to warrant a reopen-
ing. U.C.A.1953, 30-5-5. 
2e Divorce <s=>254(2) 
Where ex-wife's claim was that ex-hus-
band used harassment, threats of bodily 
harm and physical abuse, and intimidation 
to force her to sign documents which result-
ed in substantially reducing her share in 
property settlement in divorce action and in 
preventing her from contesting allegations 
in divorce complaint, ex-wife did not plead 
change of circumstances and therefore was 
not entitled to have divorce decree modi-
fied. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
3. Judgment <8=>386(1) 
Rule authorizing trial court to relieve 
party from final judgment or decree pro-
cured by fraud if motion is made within 
three months after judgment does not limit 
power of court to entertain independent 
common-law action to set aside judgment or 
decree for fraud or duress after three-
month period has expired. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 60(b). 
4. Judgment <*=>456(1) 
Doctrine of laches and other equitable 
principles determine time within which in-
dependent common-law action to satisfy 
judgment or decree for fraud or duress 
must be brought 
5. Judgment <*=»372> 443(1) 
Extrinsic fraud arises from acts pre-
venting fair submission of case for adjudi-
cation and intrinsic fraud refers to matters 
occurring during course of proceedings, 
such as false testimony during trial, which 
may have influenced the judgment. 
6. Judgment <s=>372 
Drawing distinction between extrinsic 
and intrinsic fraud in deciding whether in-
dependent action for relief from prior judg-
ment lies has little merit and distinction 
should be abandoned in determining when 
independent action may lie to set aside 
judgment or decree on ground that it was 
obtained by fraud, overruling Clissold v. 
Clissold, 30 Utah 2d 430, 519 P.2d 241, to 
extent that it is contrary to holding. 
7. Divorce <s=>165(3) 
Intentional act by party in divorce ac-
tion which prevents; opposing party from 
making full defense amounts to fraud upon 
opposing party, as well as upon justice, jus-
tifying court in setting aside decree so 
obtained. 
8. Judgment <*»90, 375 
When fraud or duress are properly 
pleaded, it is not important whether decree 
is entered after litigation or by consent 
9. Divorce <*=»165(5%) 
Ex-wife's complaint alleging that ex-
husband used harassment, threats of bodily 
harm and physical abuse, and intimidation 
to force her to sign documents which result-
ed in substantially reducing her share in 
property settlement in divorce action and in 
preventing her from contesting allegations 
in divorce complaint and wherein she 
sought damages or, alternatively, imposi-
tion of constructive trust on ex-husband's 
property stated claim upon which relief 
could be granted. 
David Nuffer, St. George, for plaintiff 
and appellant. 
Phillip L. Foremaster, St. George, for de-
fendant and respondent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiff appeals the district court's order 
dismissing her amended complaint for fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted. We reverse and remand for 
further proceedings. 
In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint 
for failure to state a claim, we assume the 
ST. PIERRE v. EDMONDS 
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plaintiffs allegations to be true and con-
strue them and the reasonable inferences 
arising therefrom liberally in determining 
whether a claim for relief has been stated. 
Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398 
?J2d 207 (1965); Heathman v. Hatch, 13 
Utah 2d 266, 372 ?J2d 990 (1962). 
On March 23, 1978, a complaint seeking a 
divorce and a division of the marital estate 
was filed. Sandra Edmonds (now St 
Pierre) was the named plaintiff and Stanley 
W. Edmonds the named defendant Ed-
monds9 attorney drafted the original di-
vorce pleadings naming St Pierre as the 
complaining party. Edmonds executed and 
filed an acknowledgment of service, consent 
to default, and a waiver of appearance in 
the original action; and both parties en-
tered into a property settlement agreement 
On April 11, 1978, the court entered a 
default judgment against Edmonds. On 
April 21,1978, another attorney retained by 
Edmonds appeared before the district court 
and moved to withdraw Edmonds' consent 
to the default and filed an answer and 
counterclaim, an acknowledgment, a con-
sent and waiver signed by St. Pierre, and a 
property settlement stipulation executed by 
both parties. The stipulation greatly re-
duced the property awarded St. Pierre. 
Based on these documents, the court grant-
ed the divorce and divided the marital es-
tate according to the terms of the stipula-
tion. 
On January 14, 1980, St Pierre initiated 
this action. In an amended complaint, she 
alleges that Edmonds used harassment, 
threats of bodily harm and physical abuse, 
and intimidation to force her to sign the 
documents which resulted in substantially 
reducing her share in the property settle-
ment in the divorce action and in prevent-
ing her from contesting the allegations in 
the divorce complaint By way of relief, 
she seeks damages in the amount of that 
1. In Land v. Land, Utah, 605 P.2d 1248 at 1251 
(1980), we held that a decree for the division of 
property based on a voluntary stipulation may 
be modified only in unusual circumstances not 
present here. The Court stated: 
. . . Accordingly, the law limits the continu-
ing jurisdiction of the court where a property 
portion of the marital estate that she claims 
she should have had, i.e., $150,000, or, alter-
natively, imposition of a constructive trust 
on the defendant's property. She also 
seeks, in the alternative, an order setting 
aside the property division in the decree and 
a new distribution of the marital assets as 
provided in the first property settlement 
agreement 
In dismissing the complaint, the district 
court stated: 
. . . it appeaifed] to the Court that the 
First Cause of Action represents facts 
which, if substantiated by credible evi-
dence would support intrinsic fraud upon 
the Court in Civil No. 6665, Sandra Ed-
monds v, Stanley W. Edmonds, divorce 
action, and more properly heard under 
30-3-5, subparagraph 1, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, as amended, in a divorce 
case . . . . 
[1,2] In this action plaintiff alleged 
common law claims which were indepen-
dent claims for relief, in addition to the 
attempt to modify the divorce decree itself. 
Clearly she was not entitled to a modifica-
tion of the divorce decree pursuant to 
§ 30-3-5. Although a court has continuing 
jurisdiction over its decree in a divorce pro-
ceeding for alimony, support, and the divi-
sion of property,1 a motion to modify the 
decree must be made in the original action 
and allege changed circumstances sufficient 
to warrant a reopening. Crofts v. Crofts, 
21 Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 701 (1968). The 
plaintiff in this action did not plead a 
change in circumstances and therefore was 
not entitled to have the decree modified. 
Nor could plaintiff obtain relief based on 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure because the time had expired for filing 
a motion to set the decree aside. 
[3] Rule 60(b) authorizes the trial court, 
on motion, to relieve a party from a final 
settlement agreement has been incorporated 
into the decree, and the outright abrogation 
of the provisions of such an agreement is 
only to be resorted to with great reluctance 
and for compelling reasons. 
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judgment or a decree procured by fraud, 
whether intrinsic or extrinsic, but only if 
the motion is made within three months 
after the judgment That rule, with its 
short time limitation, does not, however, 
limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent common law action to set aside 
a judgment or decree for fraud or duress 
after the three-month period has expired. 
Indeed, Rule 60(b) expressly recognizes and 
preserves the court's historic powers to re-
lieve a party from the operations of an 
unconscionable judgment or order. "It re-
mains clear, as it has from the beginning, 
that Rule 60(b) does not limit the power of 
a court to entertain an independent action/' 
7 Moore's Federal Practice, § 60.31 at 502 
(2d ed. 1979). 
The well established and fundamental 
doctrines designed to establish the stability 
of judgments and decrees must yield to the 
overriding principle that in our system of 
justice the essential integrity of the adjudi-
catory process must be preserved. One who 
would destroy that integrity cannot plead 
as a defense that his fraud on the system of 
justice must be protected in the name of 
preserving judgments. Thus, it has long 
been recognized by state and federal courts 
alike that an independent equitable action 
for relief from a prior judgment is available 
in addition to those remedies afforded un-
der Rule 60(b). E.g., Bizzell v. Hemingway, 
548 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1977); Kodekey Elec-
tronics Inc. v. Mechanex Corporation, 500 
F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1974); Anderson v. State 
Department of Highways, Alaska, 584 P.2d 
537 (1978); Perper v. Pima County, 123 
Ariz. 439, 600 P.2d 52 (1979); Dudley v. 
Keller, 33 Colo.App. 320, 521 P.2d 175 
(1974); Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 
328, 612 P.2d 1175 (1980); Selway v. Burns, 
150 Mont. 1, 420 P.2J G40 (1967); Dunham 
v. First National Bank in Sioux Falls, 86 
S.D. 727, 201 N.W.2d 227 (1972); Jerkins v. 
McKinney, Tenn., 533 S.W.2d 275 (1976). 
See also 11 Wright and Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, § 2868 (1973); 7 
Moore's Federal Practice, §§ 60.31,60.36 (2d 
ed. 1979); Moore, Federal Relief from Civil 
Judgments, 55 Yale LJ. 623 (1946). 
[4] Nonetheless, even when there is 
fraud in obtaining a judgment, there must 
be some limit on the bringing of an action 
to set the judgment aside. The time limita-
tion in Rule 60(b), however, does not control 
the filing of an independent action. Rath-
er, the doctrine of latches and other equita-
ble principles determine the time within 
which the action must be brought. Kg., 
Compton v. Compton, supra; Selway v. 
Burns, supra; Dunham v. First National 
Bank in Sioux Falls, supra; 7 Moore's Fed-
eral Practice, § 60.33 (2d ed. 1979); 11 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure, § 2868 (1973). 
The availability of an independent action 
for setting aside a judgment has been said 
to rest on whether the fraud alleged is 
"intrinsic" or "extrinsic." The distinction 
between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud origi-
nated in United States v. Throckmorton, 98 
U.S. 61, 25 L.Ed. 93 (1878), where the Court 
held that the fraud that was the basis of an 
independent action for relief must be ex-
trinsic rather than intrinsic. However, 
thirteen years later, Marshall v. Holmes, 
141 U.S. 589, 12 S.Ct 62, 35 L.Ed. 870 
(1891), declared the "settled doctrine" that 
relief from a prior judgment would lie 
whenever it is "against conscience to exe-
cute a judgment" and the party seeking 
relief is without fault. 
[5] Extrinsic fraud arises from acts pre-
venting the fair submission of the case for 
adjudication. Clissold v. Clissold, 30 Utah 
2d 430, 519 P.2d 241 (1974); Auerbach v. 
Samuels, 10 Utah 2d 152, 349 P.2d 1112 
(1960). Intrinsic fraud refers to matters 
occurring during the course of the proceed-
ings, such as false testimony during the 
trial, which may have influenced the judg-
ment. Clissold ve Clissold, supra, Crouch v. 
McGaw, 134 Tex. 633, 138 S.W.2d 94 (1940). 
Needless to say, the line between the two is 
neither straight nor bright. 
We recognize that a number of courts 
continue to adhere to the Throckmorton 
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic 
fraud. However, a number of other courts 
have abandoned the distinction and recog-
nize an independent claim for relief from 
ST. PIERRE v. EDMONDS 
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judgments for both extrinsic and intrinsic rected at her by Edmonds. 
Utah 619 
fraud. E.g., Bussey v. Bussey, 95 N.H. 349, 
64 A.2d 4 (1949) (divorce case). Boring v. 
Ott, 138 Wis. 260, 119 N.W. 865 (1909), 
(approved in 22 Harv.L.Rev. 600 (1909)); 
Laun v. Kipp, 155 Wis. 347, 145 N.W. 183 
(1914). Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 P.2d 
949, 952 (3rd Cir. 1939), cert, denied, 308 
U.S. 624, 60 S.Ct. 379, 84 L.Ed. 521 (1940). 
[6] Drawing a distinction between ex-
trinsic and intrinsic fraud in deciding 
whether an independent action for relief 
from a prior judgment lies, has little merit 
Professors Wright and Miller state that, 
"[s]ince there is iittle real basis for the 
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic 
fraud/ it would be unfortunate if the an-
cient learning on this point were to be 
resurrected as a limitation on independent 
actions now that it is at last decently buried 
with regards to motions." [Footnotes omit-
ted.] 11 Wright & Miller, § 2861 at 196 
(1931). A survey of the cases supports the 
observation that: 
The perpetuation of this extrinsic-intrin-
sic distinction has led the federal courts 
into a thicket of inconsistency, because 
the distinction is unnecessary, often irra-
tional, and potentially productive of in-
justices not outweighed by the interests 
of finality. [Rule 60(b): Survey and Pro-
posal for General Reform, 60 Cal.L.Rev. 
531, 542 (1972).] 
We agree that the extrinsic-intrinsic dis-
tinction fails to provide a rational basis for 
the harsh legal consequences which flow 
from it. We, therefore, decline to deter-
mine whether the allegations in the com-
plaint constitute the equivalent of extrinsic 
or intrinsic fraud and hold that the distinc-
tion should be abandoned in determining 
when an independent action may lie to set 
aside a judgment or decree on the ground 
that it was obtained by fraud.2 
Plaintiff alleges that her waiver of ap-
pearance and her execution of the second 
settlement agreement resulted directly 
from physical and mental intimidation di-
Relying on the 
alleged acknowledgment, waiver and con-
sent, the district court granted Edmonds a 
default divorce and divided the marital 
property pursuant to the agreement ten-
dered by him. Assuming plaintiff's allega-
tions to be true, as we must at this point, 
she was prevented by defendant's duress 
from presenting her evidence to the trial 
court in the divorce proceeding. 
[7] An intentional act by a party in a 
divorce action which prevents the opposing 
party from making a full defense "amounts 
to fraud upon the opposing party, as well as 
upon justice, justifying a court in setting 
aside the decree so obtained." [Citations 
omitted.] Berg v. Berg, 22fl Minn. 173,175, 
34 N.W.2d 722, 724 (1948). Duress and 
fraud are commonly held sufficient to va-
cate a property settlement in a divorce de-
cree. Cary v. Gary, 257 Ala. 431, 59 So.2d 
659 (1952). "Public interest requires that 
no spouse be defrauded or coerced by the 
other in obtaining a decree of divorce." 
Guzzo v. Guzzo, 269 Wis. 21, 2&-29, 68 
N.W.2d 559, 563 (1955). In Anno. 157 
A.L.R. 6, 80 (1945) it is stated: 
Duress as a ground for setting aside a 
default judgment of divorce has been fre-
quently bracketed by the courts with 
fraud. Generally speaking, the courts 
will, as in the case of fraud exercise 
their power and set aside a judgment 
obtained by duress. 
[8] When fraud or duress are properly 
pleaded, it is not important whether the 
decree is entered after litigation or by con-
sent Civic Western Corporation v. Zila 
Industries, Inc., 66 Cal.App.3d 1, 135 Cal. 
Rptr. 915 (1977); Parke v. Parke, 72 Idaho 
435, 242 P.2d 860, 863 (1952). 
[9] The claim in this case is for damages 
and in the alternative for a constructive 
trust to be imposed on the assets awarded 
defendant that had been part of the marital 
estate. In a narrow sense, therefore, the 
daim for relief does not seek to set the 
2. To the extent that Chssold v Chssold 30 
Utah 2d 430, 519 P2d 241 (1974) is contrary to 
this holding, it is overruled. 
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decree aside, although it is clear that the 
action attacks the property distribution 
made under the decree and therefore, the 
decree itself. Since, as we have held, a 
claim for relief was stated that could have 
resulted in setting the decree aside, it fol-
lows that the less drastic remedy sought in 
this case does not preclude the action. In 
sum, plaintiffs allegations of duress state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted. 
Affirmed as to the motion to modify and 
reversed in all other respects and remanded 
for further proceedings. Costs to appellant. 
HALL, C. J., and OAKS and HOWE, JJ., 
concur. 
DURHAM, J., does not participate herein. 
( o I KEY NUMBERSYSTf M ^ 
NORTH PARK BANK OF COMMERCE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Vc 
Donald G. NICHOLS and Joseph H. 
Bottum, Defendants and Appellant 
No. 17498. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 22, 1982. 
Guarantor of loan appealed from a 
judgment of the First District Court, Cache 
County, VeNoy Christopherson, J., holding 
him jointly liable with borrower for the 
balance due on three promissory notes 
signed by borrower. The Supreme Court, 
Hall, C. J., held that guarantor was liable 
for the entire balance owed by borrower to 
lender on three separate loans even though 
guarantor had only guaranteed the first 
loan where the agreement signed by guar-
antor stated that guarantor agreed to guar-
antee payment of all obligations of borrow-
er to lender "now existing or which may 
thereafter arise," and where the agreement 
was to "encompass future accommodations 
and indebtednesses" of borrower, in that 
such language was unambiguous as to guar-
antor's liability with respect to borrower's 
future obligations. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
Guaranty <s=»36(l) 
Guarantor of loan was liable for entire 
balance due by borrower to lender on origi-
nal loan and two subsequent loans where 
guarantor had agreed in agreement to 
guarantee payment when due of any and all 
obligations of borrower to lender "now ex-
isting or which may thereafter arise," and 
where agreement was to "encompass future 
accommodations and indebtednesses" of 
borrower, in that such language was unam-
biguous as to guarantor's liability with re-
spect to borrower's future obligations. 
C. C. Patterson, Ogden, for Bottum. 
Frank M. Wells, Ogden, for Nichols. 
Walter G. Mann, Bngham City, for plain-
tiff and respondent. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Defendant Joseph H. Bottum appeals a 
judgment holding him jointly liable with 
defendant Donald G. Nichols for the bal-
ance due on a total of three promissory 
notes signed by Nichols 
Nichols borrowed $40,000 from plaintiff 
North Park Bank of Commerce on Decem-
ber 15, 1976, executing a promissory note 
and pledging 130,000 shares of Ametek 
stock as collateral. As additional security, 
appellant Bottum signed an agreement 
promising to personally guarantee payment 
of the loan. On January 7, 1977, plaintiff 
loaned Nichols an additional $5,000 without 
obtaining further security. 
Nichols' original promissory note fell due 
on March 15, 1977, and his $5,000 note fell 
due on April 7, 1977. However, as of April 
21, 1977, Nichols had paid only the interest 
on these notes. At that time, Nichols 
signed a new promissory note for the entire 
$45,000 principal. 
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Sylvia AVERBACH, Appellant, 
v. 
RIVAL MANUFACTURING CO. 
No. 86-1196. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Third Circuit 
Argued Oct 14, 1986. 
Decided Jan. 20, 1987. 
Action was brought seeking relief 
from judgment in products liability action. 
The United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Daniel H. 
Huyett, 3rd, J., dismissed complaint and 
plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Gibbons, Chief Judge, held that (1) plain-
tiff failed to state RICO cause of action 
based on manufacturer's false answers to 
interrogatories in lawsuit, and (2) plaintiffs 
fraud action against manufacturer based 
on manufacturer's false answers to inter-
rogatories stated cause of action for fraud. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded. 
1. Commerce «=»82.70 
The court may be an enterprise within 
the meaning of Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1961 et seq. 
2. Commerce <&»82.72 
Plaintiffs allegation that defendant, 
by serving through mail its false answers 
to interrogatories, engaged in a pattern of 
racketeering activity, thereby disrupting 
court processes, did not state cause of ac-
tion under Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act, where litigants be-
fore court did not share with court's per-
sonnel a common purpose with respect to 
the activity complained of. 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1962(c). 
3. Federal Courts «=»542 
In view of that fact that plaintiffs 
claim on its face may have satisfied re-
quirements of statute which confers diver-
sity jurisdiction on federal courts, and di-
versity unquestionably existed, Court of 
Appeals would treat complaint as diversity 
claim, though amendment to assert diversi-
ty basis of jurisdiction was denied in trial 
court 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332, 1653. 
4. Fraud <s=>41 
Plaintiffs complaint stating that man-
ufacturer of can opener alleged to have 
caused fire, was not candid in answering 
interrogatory, as to number of complaints 
it had received involving fires allegedly 
caused by can opener, and stating that 
manufacturer's failure to provide truthful 
response prevented plaintiff from present-
ing to jury fact that can opener fires were 
common and serious problem known to 
manufacturer, was sufficient to state cause 
of action for fraud. 
5. Federal Civil Procedure <®=>2642 
Time limit in Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure permitting relief from final judg-
ment, on motion made within one year, for 
fraud, misrepresentation, or other miscon-
duct of adverse party did not apply to 
independent actions also permitted by rule. 
Fe&Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 60, 60(b), (b)(6), 
60 note, 28 U.S.C.A. 
6. Judgment <s=>440 
Elements of cause of action for relief 
from judgment on the ground of fraud, in 
independent action, were not different from 
those elements needed in motion for relief 
from judgment for fraud, misrepresenta-
tion or other misconduct of adverse party, 
and, in independent action brought more 
than one year after one-year time limit for 
motion for relief from judgment, plaintiff 
was not required to establish fraud on 
court Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRules 60, 60(b), 
(bX6), 60 note, 28 U.S.C.A. 
7. Federal CouiU 4-313 
In view of existence of diversity juris-
diction between plaintiff and defendant, 
district court had subject matter jurisdic-
tion over plaintiffs independent action for 
relief from judgment on ground of fraud. 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1332. 
EXHIBIT E 
AVERBACH v. 
CItea.809F.2d1 
John J. O'Brien, III (argued), Philadel-
phia, Pa., for appellant. 
William T. Campbell, Jr. (argued), Robert 
B; Mulhern, Jr., Swartz, Campbell & Det-
weiler, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee. 
Before GIBBONS, Chief Judge, 
BECKER, Circuit Judge and BROWN, 
District Judge.* 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
GIBBONS, Chief Judge: 
Sylvia Averbach appeals from an order 
dismissing, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), 
her complaint seeking relief from a judg-
ment The judgment from which she seeks 
relief was entered in favor of the defend-
ants in a product liability action in the 
United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania, Averbach v. 
Rival Manufacturing Company, Civil No. 
78-1350, following a jury verdict on June 5, 
1981. No appeal was taken from that judg-
ment On September ,28, 1984 Averbach 
filed a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion seeking a 
new trial. That motion was denied because 
it was filed more than a year after the 
judgment from which relief was sought, 
and this court affirmed on November 1, 
1985c While the appeal was pending this 
separate action was filed in May, 1985. It 
pleads two counts: violation of the Racke-
teer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. (1982 & Supp. 
Ill 1985) (RICO), and common law fraud. 
We hold that the RICO count fails to state 
a claim upon which Averbach may obtain 
relief from a judgment We also hold that 
the common law fraud count would permit 
proof of facts which could afford relief 
from a judgment, that there was subject 
matter jurisdiction of that count, and that 
it should not have been dismissed at the 
pleading stage. 
I. 
In the underlying action Averbach 
sought to recover damages resulting from 
IVAL MFG. CO. 1017 
16 (3rdClr. 1987) 
a fire in her home which, she claimed, was 
caused by a defective Rival electric can 
opener. During discovery in that action 
Averbach served on Rival Manufacturing 
Company an interrogatory asking: 
If the Defendant has within the past 
five years received any complaints of an 
occurrence similar to that allegedly expe-
rienced by the Plaintiff, please state for 
each such complaint 
(a) Its date; 
(b) Its substance, including a descrip-
tion of the factual circumstances; 
(c) The name and address of the per-
son making the complaint 
Plaintiffs Interrogatories, Civ. No. 78-
1350 at 10. Rival Manufacturing Compa-
ny, on July 1, 1979, responded: 
(a) December 7, 1976. 
(b) The claim was for property damage 
to a house. It was alleged that a Rival 
Model 731/1 Can Opener/Knife Sharpen-
er caused a fire. The evidence did not 
support the claimant's allegations, the 
claim was denied by the Company and 
dropped by the claimant 
(c) This was a subrogation claim by 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 
5725 Foxridge Drive, Shawnee Mission, 
Kansas 66202. 
Defendant Rival's Answers to Plaintiffs 
Interrogatories, Civ. No. 78-1350 at 5-6. 
No other occurrence was disclosed. A sim-
ilar interrogatory served on Rival Manufac-
turing Company by a cross-claimant, the 
retail seller of the can opener, S. Klein 
Department Stores, was answered identi-
cally. Thus Averbach was informed of a 
single fire damage claim, made on behalf 
of a fire insurer, which that insurer appar-
ently dropped after inquiry. At trial the 
jury decided in favor of the defendant 
In the instant action the complaint alleg-
es th£t in August, 1983 Averbach's counsel 
learned that the Consumer Products Safety 
Commission had information about Rival 
* Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr., United States 
District Judge for the District of New Jersey, 
sitting by designation. 
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electric can openers causing fires. Counsel 
obtained copies of the Commission's 
records which disclosed that between 1968 
and 1974 Rival Manufacturing Company 
received 23 complaints of fires, 22 of which 
involved Rival electric can openers. In 
1975 two more fires were brought to Ri-
val's attention and in 1976 two others were 
reported. In addition, after the date of the 
answer to the interrogatory but before trial 
Rival received reports of fires started by 
can openers in California, Chicago, and 
Philadelphia. All of these reports indicated 
that the arrangement of the electric switch 
was such that the device remained on at 
low speed when not in use, causing a heat 
buildup to the point of combustion. 
If the information from the files of the 
Consumer Products Safety Commission 
about fires begun by Rival electric can 
openers is true, the answers to interrogato-
ries served in the underlying action are 
grossly false. Rival would have had com-
plaints, as of July 1, 1979, of at least 26 
similar occurrences, not the one incident 
that was disclosed. The complaint alleges 
that, had truthful answers been given, Av-
erbach's presentation to the jury would 
have been much stronger, and could have 
produced a different verdict. 
II. 
In Count I Averbach alleges that by 
serving through the mails its false answers 
to interrogatories, Rival Manufacturing 
Company engaged in a pattern of racke-
teering activity, thereby corrupting an en-
terprise, the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
The theory of the complaint is that the 
district court is an enterprise and that Ri-
val Manufacturing Company, by serving 
the false answers to interrogatories, partic-
ipated in the conduct of that enterprise's 
affairs, all within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962(c) (1982). 
[1,2] We agree that a court may be an 
enterprise within the meaning of RICO. 
1. Averbach did not plead, and does not here 
contend that Rival Manufacturing Company's 
See United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2( 
443, 450 (3d Cir.1979) (Philadelphia Traffi< 
Court); United States v. Herman, 58S 
F.2d 1191 (3d Cir.1978), cert denied, 441 
U.S. 913, 99 S.Ct 2014, 60 L.Ed.2d 386 
(1979) (Pittsburgh Magistrates); United 
States v. Vignola, 464 F.Supp. 1091, 1095 
(E.D.Pa.), affd mem., 605 F.2d 1199 (3d 
Cir.1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1072, 100 
S.Ct 1015, 62 L.Ed.2d 753 (1980), (Philadel-
phia Traffic Court). In those cases in 
which courts have been recognized as 
RICO enterprises, however, the partici-
pants engaged in patterns of activities de-
signed to corrupt the operation of the 
courts' own processes. Whereas litigants 
before courts call upon the courts to exer-
cise the judicial process, they do not partic-
ipate in it in the sense intended by Con-
gress in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). Such 
litigants do not share with the court's per-
sonnel a common purpose with respect to 
the activity complained of. Indeed Aver-
bach's allegations suggest that while those 
responsible for conducting Rival Manufac-
turing Company's defense of product liabil-
ity litigation may have had a common or 
shared purpose, that purpose was quite at 
variance with those of the judges and sup-
port personnel of the district court. If 
Averbach's allegations are true, no more 
occurred with respect to the enterprise in 
question than to mislead those who con-
ducted it. That is not, in our view, equiva-
lent to the participation in its affairs which 
is required by 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). 
Since Averbach's allegations fall short of 
a charge that Rival Manufacturing Compa-
ny participated in the affairs of the district 
court, that court properly dismissed Count 
I of her complaint for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted.1 
III. 
The district court, having dismissed the 
RICO count as to which there was federal 
question subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), treated Averbach's 
common law fraud claim as a pendent state 
affairs were conducted in such a manner as to 
make Rival an enterprise for RICO purposes. 
AVERBACH v« RIVAL MFG. CO. 
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law claim. That claim was dismissed based 
on United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 US. 
715, 726, 86 S.Ct 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 
218 (1966), which held that if federal claims 
are dismissed before trial, pendent state 
claims ordinarily should be dismissed as 
well. Thereafter Averbach moved to 
amend her complaint to rely upon diversity 
jurisdiction. The district court ruled that 
leave to amend was required because a 
Rule 12(b) motion had already been grant-
ed See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). In deciding 
the motion, the court considered whether 
the complaint as amended would survive a 
motion to dismiss, and concluded that it 
would not Thus, purporting to apply the 
pleading standard of Conley v. Gibson, 355 
U.S. 41,78 S.Ct 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), the 
court ruled that the complaint failed to 
state a claim on which relief from a judg-
ment could be obtained on the ground of 
common law fraud. 
[3] In our view, leave to amend proba-
bly was not required because the com-
plaint, although mentioning only 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 (1982) and 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982), 
on its face may satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1332 
(1982), which confers diversity jurisdiction 
on the federal courtSo It alleges that Aver-
bach is a citizen of Pennsylvania and the 
amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. It 
pleads Rival's address in Kansas City, Mis-
souri and refers to the underlying action 
which was a diversity suit Thus Aver-
bach's motion to amend may have been 
surplusage. Whether or not it was neces-
sary, however, the motion must be con-
sidered in light of the direction that 
"[d]efective allegations of jurisdiction may 
be amended, upon terms, in the trial or 
appellate courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (1982). 
Since there unquestionably is diversity jur-
isdiction, and Rival Manufacturing Compa-
ny always was aware of that fact, we will 
treat the complaint accordingly. 
[4] The next question we must address, 
therefore, is whether the complaint states a 
claim upon which relief from the instant 
judgment can be obtained on the ground of 
fraud. The district court, citing Thomas v. 
Seaman, 451 Pa. 347, 304 A.2d 134 (1973), 
referred to the five standard elements of a 
cause of action for fraud: (1) a misrepre-
sentation of fact, (2) fraudulently uttered, 
(3) with intent to induce reliance, (4) and 
inducing justifiable reliance, (5) and to the 
injury of the injured party. The court con-
cluded that "[t]he complaint fails to allege 
that defendants intended to induce action 
on the part of the plaintiff or that plaintiff 
justifiably relied upon the alleged misrepre-
sentations." Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 
Civ. No. 85-2794 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 12, 1986) 
[Available on WESTLAW, DCTU data-
base]. We cannot agree. The complaint 
explains that Averbach's theory in the un-
derlying case, supported by the report of 
the Fire Marshal who investigated the fire, 
was that the fire started when a defective 
switch in the Rival electric can opener per-
mitted the unit to continue operating when 
not in use, causing heat and ultimately 
combustion. It explains further that in the 
discovery stage, through the interrogatory 
quoted above, it sought information that is 
patently relevant to that theory, that Rival 
Manufacturing Company had such informa-
tion in its possession with respect to 26 
incidents consistent with that theory, and 
that the answer falsely referred only to 
one. It is literally true that the complaint 
does not allege in haec verba that the inter-
rogatories were served for the purpose of 
obtaining information for use in the prepa-
ration or presentation of Averbach's case, 
that Rival Manufacturing Company knew 
of such purpose, and that Rival Manufac-
turing intended to cause Averbach to rely 
on its false answer. After alleging that 
Rival was aware of facts inconsistent with 
that answer, however, the complaint 
charges: 
33. It is clear from the foregoing evi-
dence that Rival was not candid with the 
Plaintiff during the discovery process. 
34. Had Rival been truthful in its an-
swers to Interrogatories the Plaintiffs 
could have presented to the jury the fact 
that the Rival can opener fires were a 
common and serious problem known to 
Rival. 
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Plaintiffs Complaint, Civ. No. 85-2794 at 
19. We find unpersuasive the proposition 
that the complaint was deficient in failing 
to allege the self-evident purpose of asking 
for information under penalty of false 
swearing in the course of discovery, or the 
self-evident purpose of responding to a re-
quest for such information. As the com-
plaint alleges, "[t]he acts and omissions of 
defendant described herein plainly consti-
tute a scheme or artifice reasonably calcu-
lated to deceive persons of ordinary pru-
dence and comprehension." IcL at 20. 
Thus the district court's reason for finding 
the fraud count to be legally insufficient 
cannot be accepted.2 
Alternatively, on the authority of Rule 
60(bX3), the district court reasoned that in 
an independent action seeking relief from a 
judgment brought more than a year after 
the one year time limit in Fed.R.Civ.P. 
60(b), the plaintiff should have to prove 
more than would be appropriate for relief, 
within that period. That part of Rule 60 
permits relief from a final judgment, on 
motion made within one year, for "fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic 
or extrinsic) misrepresentation, or other 
misconduct of an adverse party." Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 60(b)(3). The court reasoned that 
unless something more was required in ac-
tions commenced more than one year after 
judgment, the one year limitation on Rule 
60(bX3) relief would be seriously compro-
mised. Therefore, the court concluded, no 
independent action could be entertained for 
relief from a judgment after one year ex-
cept for "fraud on the court" as distin-
guished from fraud on a party. Moreover, 
fraud on the court "did not include perju-
ry," which is essentially what Averbach 
alleged, but only egregious misconduct that 
involves corruption of the judicial process 
itself. 
2. In determining whether a complaint states a 
cause of action we are bound to consider not 
only the statements in the pleading itself but 
also to draw reasonable inferences in favor of 
the pleader. Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 
1269, 1273 (3d Cir.1974). Here we infer that 
defendants are alleged to have made their false 
statements with the intention of inducing plain* 
[5] There are several problems v 
this line of reasoning. The first is texti 
The one year limit in Rule 60(b) appi 
only to three of six listed grounds for rel 
from judgment: (1) mistake, inadverten 
surprise, or excusable neglect, (2) nev 
discovered evidence, and (3) fraud. It dc 
not apply to the catchall provision coverii 
"any other reason justifying relief from t 
operation of the judgment." Fed.R.Civ. 
60fl>X6). Moreover Rule 60 provides th 
"[t]his rule does not limit the power of 
court to entertain an independent action 1 
relieve a party from a judgment, order, ( 
proceeding . . . , or to set aside a judgmei 
for fraud upon the court" Thus the on 
year time limit in the rule, by virtue of th 
rule's very text, does not apply to indepen 
dent actions. The Note of the Advisor 
Committee on Rules is quite clear in this 
respect 
If the right to make a motion is lost by 
the expiration of the time limits fixed in 
these rules, the only other procedural 
remedy is by a new or independent action 
to set aside a judgment upon those prin-
ciples which have heretofore been applied 
in such an action. Where the indepen-
dent action is resorted to, the limitations 
of time are those of laches or statutes of 
limitations. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) advisory committee note. 
The laches or statute of limitations to 
which the Advisory Committee Note refers 
are to the governing time bars under the 
law which give rise to the independent 
cause of action. 
Nor does the rule purport to specify ei-
ther the "other reasons justifying relief 
from the operation of a judgment" or the 
substantive rules which may authorize a 
court in an independent action to grant 
relief from a judgment The reason for the 
absence of such a specification is plain. 
tiff to rely detrimentally thereon. We are there-
fore unwilling to hold that this complaint does 
not state a cause of action for purposes of Rule 
12(b)(6). Upon remand plaintiff may wish to 
consider amending her complaint by pleading 
fraud with greater particularity. See Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 9(b). 
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Prior to the adoption of Rule 60 both the 
substantive and the procedural law dealing 
with relief from judgment were complex. 
The Advisory Committee 
endeavored [in 1946] to amend the rules 
to permit, either by motion or by inde-
pendent action, the granting of various 
kinds of relief from judgments which 
were permitted in the federal courts pri-
or to the adoption of these rules, and the 
amendment concludes with a provision 
abolishing the use of bills of review and 
the other common law writs referred to, 
and requiring the practice to be by mo-
tion or by independent action. 
Id The change in 1946 thus was intended 
to eliminate the procedural complexities of 
the former practice, while preserving two 
alternative remedies, a motion or an inde-
pendent action. 
Prior to 1946, fraud was not an express 
ground for a Rule 60(b) motion, and a dis-
pute arose over whether relief on that 
ground could be obtained by motion Rule 
60(b)(3) was added in that year, and the 
advisory committee explained; 
The amendment settles this problem by 
making fraud an express ground for re-
lief by motion; and under the saving 
clause, fraud may be urged as a basis for 
relief by independent action insofar as 
established doctrine permits. 
Id. The advisory committee reference to 
established doctrine is to the substantive 
law, found elsewhere than in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, for relief from 
judgment 
It should be noted that Rule 60(b) does 
not assume to define substantive law as 
to the grounds for vacating judgments, 
but merely prescribes the practice in pro-
ceedings to obtain relief. 
Id. Neither the text of Rule 60(b) nor its 
legislative history permits a construction 
which would limit an independent action for 
relief from a judgment to "fraud on the 
court" as distinguished from fraud of some 
other sort Indeed such an attempt by the 
rulemakers to affect rights claimed under 
the substantive law would probably have 
exceeded the authority conferred in the 
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(1982). See Burbank, Interjurisdictional 
Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and 
Federal Common Law: A General Ap-
proach, 71 Cornell L.Rev. 733, 772 (1986). 
One may reasonably ask what was the 
purpose of the drafters in subjecting Rule 
60(b)(1), (2) and (3) motions to a one year 
time limit if not to create a substantive 
time bar. The answer, as is so often the 
case with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, lies in the former practice. Prior to 
their adoption, there were terms of court, 
and certain common law methods of obtain-
ing relief from judgments were deemed to 
be unavailable after the expiration of the 
term at which the judgment was entered. 
E.g.f United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 
35 S.Ct 16, 59 L.Ed. 129 (1914). When 
both the terms of court and the common 
law writs were abolished, the time limit 
with respect to some motion equivalents of 
the former common law writs was substi-
tuted. See 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed-
eral Practice and Procedure § 2866, at 
227 n. 66 (1973). Under the old practice, 
however, the expiration of the term of 
court had no effect upon the timeliness of 
an independent action for relief from judg-
ment. The rule carries forward this same 
principle. "The motion procedure is sub-
ject to a one year limit, which does not 
apply to the independent action for fraud." 
Id. § 2868, at 240. 
[6] Additionally, the separate treatment 
in Rule 60 of the somewhat confusing con-
cept of "fraud on the court" as a distinct 
ground for relief is traceable to the well-
known decision in Hazel-Atlas Glass Com-
pany v. Hartford-Empire Company, Z22 
U.S. 238, 248-49, 64 S.Ct 997, 1002-03, 88 
L.Ed. 1250 (1944), modified in Standard 
Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 97 
S.Ct 31, 50 L.Ed.2d 21 (1976) (per curiam), 
in which it was held that a court has inher-
ent power to set aside a judgment obtained 
by such a fraud, even in circumstances 
where the adverse party might be barred 
by laches or lack of diligence from obtain-
ing relief. As the advisory committee ex-
plains: 
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(T]he rule expressly does not limit the 
power of the court, when fraud has been 
perpetrated upon it, to give relief under 
the saving clause. As an illustration of 
this situation, see Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. 
v. Hartford-Empire Co. ... 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). What is required to 
trigger the court's inherent power to grant 
relief even when equitable principles might 
bar a party from such relief has been a 
matter of controversy. 
Perhaps the principal contribution of all 
these attempts to define 'fraud on the 
court' and to distinguish it from mere 
'fraud' is as a reminder that there is a 
distinction. Any fraud connected with 
the presentation of a case to a court is a 
fraud upon the court, in the broad sense. 
That cannot be the sense in which the 
term is used in the final saving clause of 
Rule 60(b). The remedy for most cases 
of fraud must continue to be by motion 
under Rule 60(b)(3) or by an independent 
action, subject to the procedural limita-
tions applicable to those remedies. 
11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 2870, at 253 (1973) (foot-
notes omitted). Something more than ordi-
nary fraud may be required in order to 
trigger the court's authority to disregard 
limitations on available relief in an indepen-
dent action or equitable defenses to an 
independent action for relief from a judg-
ment The Hazel-Atlas rule, however, oth-
erwise has nothing to do with the elements 
of a cause of action for such relief. 
Rule 60(b)(3) covers all fraud "whether 
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrin-
sic." No similar language appears in the 
saving clause which preserves the indepen-
dent action. Its absence has led some 
courts to conclude that if relief from a 
judgment is sought by an independent ac-
tion the old distinction between "extrinsic" 
and "intrinsic" fraud persists.3 A leading 
commentator notes, however, that 
(The distinction] is most unfortunate, if 
true. [It] rests on cloudy and confused 
3. See e.g., Dowdy v. Hawfteld, 189 F.2d 637 
(D.GCir.), cert denied, 342 VS. 830, 72 S.Ct. 54, 
authorities, its soundness as a matter < 
policy is very doubtful, and it is extremi 
ly difficult to apply. It ought not t 
persist as a limit on independent action 
now that it has been abolished on mc 
tions. 
11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 2868, at 240-41 (1973 
(footnotes omitted). Moreover, the "extrin 
sic"—"intrinsic" distinction which is basec 
on a statement in United States v. Throck-
morton, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 61, 25 L.Ed. 93 
(1878), was overruled, if it was ever the 
law, by Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, 
12 S.Ct 62, 35 L.Ed. 870 (1891). The dis-
tinction probably would not in any event 
survive Erie Railroad Company v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 
1188 (1938), and Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 
2079 (1945), at least with respect to judg-
ments in diversity cases. As Guaranty 
Trust Co. v. York makes clear, there is no 
longer a federal substantive law of eq-
uitable remedies. Id. Furthermore, even 
before the 1946 amendment to Rule 60(b), 
which added Rule 60(b)(3), the extrinsic-in-
trinsic fraud distinction was rejected by 
this court. Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 
F.2d 949, 950 (3d Cir.1939), cert denied, 
308 U.S. 624, 60 S.Ct. 379, 84 LEA 521 
(1940). See also Bandai America Inc. v. 
Bally Midway Mfg. Co., 775 F.2d 70, 73 (3d 
Or.1985), cert denied, — U.S. , 106 
S.Ct 1265, 89 LEd.2d 574 (1986); Schum 
v. Bailey, 578 F.2d 493, 506 (3d Cir.1978) 
(Gibbons, J., concurring). Thus we must 
reject Rival Manufacturing Company's ar-
gument, in support of the order appealed 
from, that its fraud, if any, was intrinsic. 
[7] Summarizing, we hold that Count II 
of Averbach's complaint, measured against 
the pleading standards of Conley v. Gib-
son, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct 99, 2 LEd.2d 80 
(1957), would permit proof of facts which 
would authorize relief from a judgment on 
the ground of fraud. We hold further that 
the elements of a cause of action for such 
96 L.Ed. 628 (1951). 
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relief in an independent action are not dif-
ferent from those elements in a Rule 
60(bX3) motion, and that the time limit on 
such a motion does not apply to an indepen-
dent action.4 Moreover, since there is di-
versity of citizenship, there is a separate 
basis for subject matter jurisdiction over 
Averbach's independent action. Thus we 
need not consider whether an independent 
action for relief from a judgment falls 
within the ancillary jurisdiction of a federal 
court which rendered the judgment 
Given these holdings with respect to 
Count II, we have considered whether the 
prior ruling of the district court denying 
Averbach's Rule 60(bX3) motion, which this 
court affirmed, might afford a separate 
ground for affirmance* We hold that it 
does not That ruling was predicated sole* 
ly upon the timeliness of the motion. The 
legal sufficiency of the claim of fraud was 
not addressed. The time bar in Rule 60, as 
we have held, has no application to this 
lawsuit 
IV. 
The judgment appealed from will be af-
firmed insofar as it dismissed Averbach's 
Count I RICO claim. It will be reversed 
insofar as it dismissed Averbach's common 
law fraud Count II, and the case will be 
remanded for further proceedings on that 
count 
(o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
•. Judge Becker agrees that the fraud alleged in 
this case could be redressed in an independent 
action. Further, he confesses his inability to see 
any basis for distinguishing the elements of a 
60(b)(3) action from those of an independent 
action. The only possible basis Judge Becker 
can envision for such a distinction is the differ-
ence between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud. 
This circuit has established, however, that the 
In the Matter of the SPECIAL FEDER-
AL GRAND JURY EMPANELLED 
OCTOBER 31, 1985. 
Appeal of John DOE, Appellant 
No. 86-5883. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Third Circuit 
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6) 
Jan. 8, 1987. 
Decided Jan. 23, 1987. 
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc 
Denied Feb. 24,1987. 
A grand jury witness refused to com-
ply with an order compelling him to provide 
samples of his handwriting in a backward 
slant The United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey, Maryanne 
Trump Barry, J., adjudged witness in civil 
contempt, and witness appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Mansmann, Circuit 
Judge, held that compelling grand jury wit-
ness to provide normal handwriting exemp-
lars with a backward slant when backhand 
was concededly not his normal writing 
style was not a testimonial communication 
for purposes of Fifth Amendment protec-
tion. 
Affirmed. 
Becker, J., filed dissenting opinion. 
Higginbotham and Becker, JJ., would 
grant rehearing in banc. 
1. Witnesses <3=>297(6) 
Compelling a grand jury witness to 
provide "normal" handwriting exemplars 
with a ''backward slant" would not consti-
tute a testimonial admission, i.e., that the 
witness would choose to slant his handwrit-
ing at a certain angle when disguising it, 
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5. 
distinction is chimerical. See Publicker v. Shall-
cross, 106 FJd 949 (3d Cir.1939), cert denied, 
308 VS. 624, 60 S.Ct. 379, 84 L.Ed. 521 (1940). 
Nonetheless, Judge Becker is not certain that 
the elements of an independent action to reopen 
a judgment for fraud are always identical to the 
elements of a 60(b)(3) action, as Judge Gibbons 
appears to hold. Judge Becker would prefer to 
reserve that issue. 
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